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DIMENSIONS OF INTEGRATION: MIGRANT YOUTH IN POLAND

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Abstract: This paper presents major findings on actual stock of migrant youth residing in Poland and prospects f their integration with the Polish society. On the base of interviews conducted with educational counsellors, teachers and representatives of migrant communities, basic factors promoting the integration of migrant youth in Poland (with particular stress put on their access to the education system) have been identified and discussed. The analysis is supplemented with detailed overview of legal regulations that influence the status of different migrant groups in Poland and cultural factors that proved to play and important role in the integration patterns of different migrant groups.

Keywords: integration, migrant youth, 1,5th and 2nd generation, migrant groups, education system

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1. General Overview [1]

Although successive waves of settlers from various ethnic groups have, throughout the country's long history, made a home for themselves in the Republic of Poland (Ihnatowicz et al., 1996), in more recent times Poland has been regarded as a clear supplier of emigrants. Only since 1989, when significant socio-economic changes took place in Poland, have conditions become attractive enough to encourage influxes of different categories of migrants, including: highly-qualified specialists and managers assigned to Poland by multinational corporations or institutions, petty traders, Asian entrepreneurs and illegal workers employed in the secondary labour market (Iglicka 2000; Iglicka 2003; Iglicka, Weinar 2002; Grzymała-Kazłowska 2002; Okólski 1998; Stola 1997). While the number of emigrants leaving Poland continues to outstrip the number of immigrants, temporary and settlement immigration has now become a constant phenomenon of social life, to the point of rooting itself both in the people's social consciousness and in the institutions, which have been forced to acknowledge the need for legal solutions to respond to this and associated phenomena.

The growth of immigration fluxes to Poland has raised many challenges in need of confrontation. First and foremost, adequate infrastructures and procedures for protecting large numbers of asylum-seekers have had to be established and developed; national borders have been sealed and a lot of effort has been put into curbing the trafficking of human beings and drug smuggling. Poland has also worked to harmonise its laws with EU regulations (*inter alia*, through the introduction of visas for Ukrainian, Belarussian, and Russian citizens) and with international law. Despite all these problems, the issue of the integration of immigrants is still treated as one of limited urgency that can be postponed to a later date. This low interest in integration matters is favoured by the relatively small scale of settlement migration into Poland: most migrants treat their stay in Poland as temporary, their main goals being economic (i.e. the immediate gathering of financial resources and their subsequent transfer back to the country of origin); alternatively, Poland is seen as a stepping stone on the way to further migration into Western European countries. Rarely is the country perceived as a final destination, which means that immigrants tend to avoid making "unnecessary" investments (for example, through the acquisition of language) into their stay in Poland (Koryś, 2002). As a consequence, the integration of first-generation migrants is often hindered.

Another issue that has, so far, been sidestepped due to the limited scale of immigration and to the lack of any spectacular problems winning the interest of public opinion, is the integration of the so-called "second generation" (immigrants' children born in the host country) or of the "1.5 generation" (immigrants' children born in the country of origin, but raised in the host

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country cf. Rumbaut, 2000). The importance of these groups is expected to grow, as statistical evidence suggests that more and more immigrants will settle in Poland with their children over the next few years. For example, it would seem that some illegal migrants from the former Soviet Union who have been circulating between Poland and their country of origin are now seeking to regularize their residence in Poland[2]; the decision to bring their children and family with them would probably be the next step towards a definitive transition of their migrant status.

Luckily, attitudes towards immigrants in Polish society are generally neutral, something that is also reflected in the ways migrants are depicted in public discourse (Mrozowski, 2003). To date, there have been no serious social frictions or any other conflicts between the native and foreign populations; this means that, in the general population's consciousness, immigrants are not defined in terms of the problems that their presence could be associated with. This is, therefore, an ideal time to systematize and describe the adaptation strategies that are taking shape among different categories of immigrants. It is also a great time to analyse the actions that the authorities have taken towards immigrants to date so as to assess prospects for integration and to identify potential barriers to that process.

1.1. Statistical Overview

It is difficult to know the exact number of immigrants currently residing in Poland because different sources give different data: they tend to either underestimate the actual number of foreign residents (which is what happened with the 2002 census) or to refer to numbers quoted in administrative decisions, e.g. the number of temporary settlement or residency permissions issued by the Office for Repatriation and Aliens, which does not, of course, have to correspond to the real number of migrants present in Poland (for more on sources of data on migration in Poland, cf. Koryś, 2004; Sakson, 2002). Despite its shortcomings, the data provided by the census is relatively useful for analysing the number of immigrants and their integration prospects. While it is hereby assumed that some of the foreigners residing in Poland were not enumerated in the census, and that many of these were in an illegal position and therefore afraid of contacts with representatives of state institutions, it is equally clear that those who were recorded fall within a group of more or less integrated foreigners, at least as far as the institutions are concerned: they were in the country legally, grasped the purpose of the census, and were able to make themselves understood by the census-takers, etc.

[2] Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Russians outnumber other migrant groups applying for fixed term residence permits (which is the first step in obtaining permanent residency and settle in Poland) cf. Table , Section 2.

Table 1: Total Number of Foreigners Resident in Poland, by Sex and Place of Origin

Country of Origin	Foreign Residents (residents without Polish citizenship)			
	Total	**Males**	**Females**	**Share of women**
Total number of Foreign Residents	49,221	24,562	24,659	50%
Born in Poland	5,079	2,591	2,488	49%
Born Abroad	43,435	21,628	21,807	50%
Born in:				
Europe	**28,463**	**12,649**	**15,814**	**56%**
of which selected countries:				
Ukraine	9,339	2,933	6,406	69%
Belarus	2,685	827	1,858	69%
Russian Federation	4,264	1,221	3,043	71%
Germany	2,096	1,334	762	36%
France	887	604	283	32%
United Kingdom	904	697	207	23%
Italy	635	513	122	19%
Netherlands	422	339	83	20%
Asia	**7,200**	**4,458**	**2,742**	**38%**
North America	**1,172**	**767**	**405**	**35%**
South America	**310**	**207**	**103**	**33%**
Africa	**1,274**	**1,077**	**197**	**15%**
Oceania	**74**	**52**	**22**	**30%**
Unknown Country	4,942	2,418	2,524	51%
Unknown Place of Birth	707	343	364	51%

Source: Census 2002

According to the census data (cf. Table 1), the total number of foreign citizens (i.e. persons without Polish citizenship) was 49,221; of these, 5,079 were Polish-born[3]. When set against the overall national population of 37.6 million, the proportion of foreigners (c.0.1%) is perceived as vanishingly small. The data also shows that, except in the cases of Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation, men, who are often the "pioneers" of migration chains, generally prevail among migrants (Sakson, 2001).

Almost 25% of all enumerated foreigners (22% of permanent residents and 30% of residents with a restricted permit) live in Mazowieckie (Mazowsze) voivodship (cf. Table 2, Map 1) and most of them are within the greater Warsaw area. Several factors contribute to this degree of concentration: first, Mazowieckie voivodship provides an absorbing labour market that offers employment opportunities to both highly-qualified experts and unqualified domestic and blue- collar workers; second, transnational environments and migrant networks are already well-established in the city; third, the area offers migrants better access to

[3] Among foreign citizens born in Poland there are those of the so-called second generation, i.e. the children of immigrants settled in Poland. Equally there may be Polish citizens whose emigrations led them to renounce Polish citizenship but are now in Poland once again.

institutions such as embassies, international schools for children, places of worship for various faiths and religious persuasions, and a better service infrastructure. It is for similar reasons that refugees also choose to settle specifically within the confined of Warsaw, even though the costs of living are markedly higher than in other regions of the country. Apart from Mazowsze, it is the Opole, Lower Silesian, Western Pomeranian, Lubuskie and Silesian regions that report the highest shares of foreign residents in Poland.

Table 2: Foreign Residents in Total Population in Poland (by Voivodship), 2002

Voivodship	Total Resident Population	Foreign Residents			
		Total	Per 100th. of Total Resident Population	Permanent Residents	Temporary Residents (12 months and more)
POLAND	**37,620,085**	**49,221**	**130.8**	**29,782**	**19,439**
Dolnośląskie	2,856,862	4,261	149.1	2,650	1,611
Kujawsko-pomorskie	2,052,650	1,660	80.9	1,164	496
Lubelskie	2,191,019	2,069	94.4	965	1,104
Lubuskie	998,007	1,421	142.4	849	572
Łódzkie	2,600,883	3,366	129.4	2,250	1,116
Małopolskie	3,157,057	3,478	110.2	1,965	1,513
Mazowieckie	**5,069,524**	**12,262**	**241.9**	**6,481**	**5,781**
Opolskie	971,930	1,616	166.3	1,220	396
Podkarpackie	2,061,005	1,624	78.8	952	672
Podlaskie	1,173,125	1,608	137.1	900	708
Pomorskie	2,137,476	2,303	107.7	1,376	927
Śląskie	4,630,323	6,278	135.6	4840	1,438
Świętokrzyskie	1,295,813	1,030	79.5	690	340
Warmińsko-mazurskie	1,411,139	1,403	99.4	802	601
Wielkopolskie	3,331,459	2,352	70.6	1,198	1,154
Zachodniopomorskie	1,681,813	2,490	148.1	1,480	1,010

Source: Census 2002

Where age structure is concerned, it is obvious that the majority of immigrants fall within the most economically productive age bracket (25-55), thereby confirming the already-mentioned thesis that foreigners are motivated to migrate for work reasons. The largest groups of migrants aged 0-14 are from Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Germany, Belarus, Vietnam, Armenia, and the United States. Knowledge about the direction that emigration flows took in the past -- from Poland to countries like Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Austria -- calls for treating data on foreign residents coming from these same countries with great caution. In fact, some individuals recorded by the census as immigrants and foreign residents may actually be former Polish citizens who were born and raised in Poland but who subsequently emigrated, renounced Polish citizenship, and adopted another citizenship before returning to Poland later on in life. Moreover, they may now be in Poland

with their foreign-born children[4]. Return migration might also account for the decidedly above-average proportion of foreign residents from these countries of post-productive age (55 years and over).

Map 1: Number of Foreigners by Residence Permit and Share of Foreign Residents per 100,000 of Native Population



The small number of immigrant children in Poland revealed by the census is confirmed by data from the Ministry of National Education (MEN) (cf. Table 4). The total number of children of foreign residents attending school in Poland in the 2003/2004 school year was 3,437, of which 60% were at primary schools, 20% at lower secondary schools and the remaining 20% at secondary schools or in further education. As with the overall population of foreign residents, these children are also concentrated in the area of Mazowsze. Ministry of National Education data indicates that relatively few children from one of the 15 EU Member States (before the accession of 10 additional countries on 1 May 2004) are enrolled in one of the schools subordinated to that Ministry: there were only 191 such children in primary school, 90 in junior high, and 53 in secondary and post-secondary school – while the stock of EU citizens calculated by the 2002 Census data amounted to 9,091 (of which at least 1,300 were children aged 0-14; cf. Table 3). The absence of EU citizens' children in Polish schools may reflect either the fact that most of the children are still of pre-school age or that their parents are striving to place their children within embassy-run schools (which are not taken into account by the MEN statistics.

[4] For more on the current return migration to Poland, see Iglicka, 2002.

Table 3: Foreign Residents by Age and Citizenship, 2002

Country of Citizenship	Total	of whom born in Poland*	Age Bracket						
			0-14 lat	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
TOTAL	**49,221**	**5,079**	**6,414**	**6,751**	**11,685**	**10,095**	**6,525**	**3,555**	**4,177**
Selected countries:									
Ukraine	9,881	542	1,15	1,682	3,156	2,048	1,053	383	409
Russian Federation	4,325	61	500	518	895	966	528	305	613
Germany	3,711	1,615	633	232	361	594	511	595	784
Belarus	2,852	167	323	587	908	467	264	140	163
Vietnam	2,093	226	366	302	507	545	315	45	12
Armenia	1,642	15	319	217	496	334	207	54	15
United States	1,321	426	295	94	193	254	160	83	240
Bulgaria	1,058	35	76	141	219	213	237	107	64
United Kingdom	1,025	121	126	46	250	298	150	92	63
France	989	102	166	69	250	195	154	67	88
Lithuania	860	18	56	258	273	110	63	44	54
Czech Republic	831	5	91	142	220	119	139	73	47
Italy	719	84	90	31	120	159	128	107	84
Greece **	532	121	24	11	31	100	119	78	169
Kazakhstan	508	0	39	206	108	75	51	15	14
Netherlands	490	68	75	17	95	129	80	57	36
Slovakia	482	53	56	97	156	89	59	20	5
Sweden	475	276	33	44	54	67	109	102	66
Serbia and Montenegro	452	0	38	36	96	126	80	48	28
Hungary	452	65	50	85	69	81	89	54	24
Mongolia	348	13	69	82	62	97	35	2	1
Austria	328	139	62	34	41	72	68	24	27
Turkey	312	28	16	29	120	107	27	12	1
China	296	43	37	24	82	99	30	14	10
India	289	10	29	21	132	73	21	11	2
Romania	275	2	31	48	99	47	23	16	10
Syria	258	0	14	23	83	104	22	10	2
Algeria	231	0	4	4	64	96	48	14	1
Spain	225	61	25	29	62	44	29	14	22
Belgium	215	30	27	8	41	41	35	31	30
Moldova	205	0	22	49	74	35	18	2	5
Japan	204	8	22	8	52	54	51	10	7
Norway	198	27	13	62	43	29	17	24	10
Croatia	189	30	7	14	51	49	36	21	11
Canada	177	38	38	7	21	39	25	8	39
Denmark	173	0	33	6	29	48	25	25	7
Georgia	168	0	15	29	44	42	27	6	5
Libya	141	11	43	8	26	56	7	1	-
Nigeria	130	3	3	21	47	50	9	-	-
Jordan	125	47	4	12	65	30	10	3	1
Yemen	117	8	21	6	59	30	1	-	-
Latvia	116	0	9	28	42	25	5	2	5
Macedonia	115	15	4	11	30	37	22	6	4
Azerbaijan	106	0	14	15	29	27	14	3	4
Iraq	105	0	7	8	16	33	27	12	2
Others	9,477	566	1,339	1,35	1,814	1,762	1,397	815	993

** Own calculation based on Census 2002*

*** Greek residents also include the offspring of political refugees who settled in Poland in the 1950s.*

Source: Census 2002

Although the stock of migrants (children and young people included) is relatively small, the years 2000-2003 brought a marked increase in the number of permanent and restricted residence permits issued to minors (c.f. Table 5). The best-represented group in this regard were immigrants from the former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, and the Russian Federation), which seems to confirm the above-mentioned hypothesis that these groups are tending towards a greater degree of stability and permanence in the host country: the pioneers of immigration are moving away from the initial phase of the migration process -- which is subordinated mostly to the need to accumulate economic, social and cultural capital (Portes, 1998) -- towards phases associated with settlement and family reunion.

Map 2. Number of Foreign pupils by Voivodship and Level of Education

Table 4: Foreign Pupils in Polish Schools in 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 Academic Years

Type of school	Foreigners		
	Total Number	Of which Permanent Residents	Of which Foreigners of EU Member States*
Primary schools	2,028	973	191
Gymnasium (Lower secondary school) I	714	378	90
General Secondary school	439	257	45
Basic vocational School	19	14	1
Vocational secondary schools	89	55	5
Post-secondary schools	133	51	2
Of which in Teacher training college	12	6	1
Fine Art Schools	15	9	0
Total	**3,437**	**1,737**	**334**

* EU Member States before 1 May 2004.

Source: Ministry of National Education

Table 5: Number and Percentage of Minors Accompanying Foreign Adults Claiming Permanent and Temporary Residence Permits by Age and Selected Country of Origin

	2001		2002		2003	
	No.	**%**	**No.**	**%**	**No.**	**%**
Permanent Residence Permit by Age						
Total 0-17	**49**	**100**	**40**	**100**	**115**	**100**
0-4	9	18	6	15	10	9
5-9	18	37	13	33	38	33
10-14	16	33	17	43	50	43
15-17	6	12	4	10	17	15
Permanent Residence Permit by Country of Origin -- selected countries						
Ukraine	16	33	7	18	31	27
Russian Federation	9	18	10	25	10	9
Belarus	4	8	0	0	14	12
Armenia	8	16	8	20	18	16
Vietnam	5	10	9	23	18	16
Temporary Residence Permit by Age						
Total 0-17	**1,667**	**100**	**1,807**	**100**	**1,823**	**100**
0-4	526	32	537	30	478	26
5-9	567	34	623	34	661	36
10-14	461	28	511	28	512	28
15-17	113	7	136	8	172	9
Temporary Residence Permit by Country of Origin -- selected countries						
Ukraine	511	31	643	30	716	39
Russian Federation	259	16	249	14	221	12
Belarus	57	3	86	5	119	7
Armenia	52	3	77	4	110	6
Vietnam	81	5	73	4	62	3
France	86	5	119	7	94	5
Germany	38	2	23	1	29	2

Source: Office for Repatriation and Aliens

Available data also points to an increase in the proportion of young asylum seekers, both in absolute numbers (cf. Table 6) and in proportion to the total number of applicants. The majority of asylum seekers who are minors are citizens of the Russian Federation, and most of them are Chechens fleeing the civil war in the region. It should be noted that refugees' children are in a special situation because they have often been through harrowing experiences and, therefore, usually require a greater amount of care from school teachers and pedagogues. As the size of this special population increases, it is inevitable that there will also be a greater need for adjustments within the country's education system.

Table 6: Number and Percentage of Minors Among Asylum Seekers, by Country of Origin and Age

	2001		2002		2003	
	No.	**%**	**No.**	**%**	**No.**	**%**
Total Asylum Applications	4,529	100	5,170	100	6,909	100
Minors Among Asylum Seekers	897	20	1,646	32	2,610	38
SELECTED COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN						
Russian Federation	606	68	1,340	81	2,501	96
Afghanistan	114	13	88	5	22	1
Armenia	76	8	37	2	26	1
Ukraine	32	4	21	1	16	0.6
Vietnam	16	2	3	0.2	0	0
Belarus	8	1	17	1	7	0.3
AGE						
0-4	413	46	608	37	1,012	39
5-9	344	38	502	30	802	31
10-14	60	6	402	24	622	24
15-17	80	9	134	8	174	7

Source: Office for Repatriation and Aliens

1.2. Relevant Migrant Groups

Legal status and the reason for migrating are the two most important criteria for differentiating groups of migrants in Poland. In reference to these two dimensions, the following groups may be listed:

1.2.1.Humanitarian Migrants: asylum seekers, refugees, and persons granted tolerated stay

The number of asylum seekers applying for refugee status in Poland is growing systematically, as is the number of children accompanying them. And although the overall number of successful applicants is fairly small, the number of acknowledged refugees or persons granted tolerated stay has also increased. The most numerous and distinctive group of refugees is composed by Chechens; this group is followed by citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (most of whom returned to their home country or left for yet another other country following the resolution of the Kosovo conflict), Afghanistan, Somalia, Georgia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. It is worth mentioning that the integration process of asylum seekers encounters many difficulties, particularly as many refugees typically prefer to leave Poland for even richer countries in Western Europe. Furthermore, very little is done to promote asylum seekers' integration into Polish society during the lengthy procedure of granting successful applicants refugee status (e.g., by teaching the Polish language). Finally, empirical evidence provided by interviewees have underscored that the quality of education offered to the children of asylum seekers requires improvement.

1.2.2 Economic Migrants

The European Union's enlargement on 1 May 2004 to 10 additional Member States has granted EU citizens residing in Poland much greater benefits and legal entitlement than other economic migrants who work or reside in Poland. EU citizens, as well as citizens of the United States and Canada, usually enjoy high economic status since they are commonly employed as experts, managers, or run their own enterprises. This group of migrants rarely becomes an object of social research despite some evidence (Szwąder, 2002) that it integrates poorly and does not mix very much with the local population; this situation does not seem to be influenced by the relatively favourable conditions provided by easy access to crucial institutions of public life, large amounts of transferable human and financial capital, and the positive attitudes of the host society.

Although the number of all sorts of economic migrants from the former Soviet republics (especially Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation) is estimated at approximately 100,000 (Iglicka, 2003), only a tiny portion of these may be described as residents or settlers: most of them are seasonal or circular migrants who come to Poland on tourist visas and then undertake short-term or irregular employment (in construction, agriculture or domestic services). Since lots of them keep coming every year, they learn Polish language quickly and establish good personal relations with their Polish employees, landlords, etc. All of this facilitates a kind of 'spontaneous' (i.e. unstructured) integration into Polish society. While the children of these economic migrants are usually left in the home country to be looked after by spouses or older relatives, they are certainly affected by their parents' seasonal migration to Poland, in both positive and negative ways.

Vietnamese and Armenians residing in Poland constitute the most integrated and visible diasporas of third country nationals. The Vietnamese community is estimated at 20-50,000 individuals (Halik, Nowicka, 2002), while it has been estimated that there are approximately 50,000 Armenians (Miecik 2004). Both of these ethnic groups have managed to carve out economic niches, with the Vietnamese specializing in gastronomy and the textile trade and the Armenians monopolizing the (mostly pirate) CD-market and dealing in general trade. Both groups also have in common a serious concern for giving their children a proper education[5], they loyally support their community's members, and are given to developing so-called "parallel societies"[6]. Interestingly, Armenians are one of oldest ethnic minorities to have settled on Polish territory (in the 14th Century). They constitute a historical example of "successful integration" long before the concept of integration was even conceived: numerous Armenians were included into the Polish gentry, successfully climbed the social ladder, and held high offices within the structures of the Polish Kingdom while also retaining their cultural identity and religion, at least until more recent times (Pełczyński, 1997). The so-called "new" wave of Armenian immigrants that arrived in Poland (and Central Europe) in the

[5] Considerable respect towards education is deeply rooted in ancient and contemporary Vietnamese culture (Halik, 2004)

[6] In-depth interview with the Officer of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens.

early 1990s (mostly as asylum seekers fleeing the Caucasian conflicts) now benefits from the assistance of "old" diaspora members who, for example, substantially help in the running of ethnic school for the children of Armenian immigrants in Warsaw. Since a number of Vietnamese and Armenian migrants were known to be living in Poland illegally (either because they overstayed their visas or because they were smuggled into Poland), the Polish government launched a regularization programme in 2003 with the aim of fully integrating those persons (and other foreigners in a similar position) who were resident in Poland since at least 1997 (Iglicka, Okólski 2003) .

1.2.3. Repatriates

Although not numerous (ca. 5,000 persons[7]), this group constitutes an interesting case study for analyzing factors contributing to integration processes. Repatriates are the offspring of Polish citizens who stayed in the Soviet Union after World War II or who were forcibly deported to one of the Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union and were not able to return during previous repatriation waves. Facilitating the "return" of repatriates is regarded as a "moral obligation" of the Polish nation towards those members who were "left aside" during World War II; for this reason, sentimental motives often became intertwined with economic ones when decisions on resettlement were taken (Najda, 2003). However, many repatriates felt disappointed and embittered when they returned to Poland, for the living conditions and the requirements of a capitalist economy appeared not to have matched their expectations. Despite the relatively substantial economic assistance provided by the Polish state to repatriates, their reintegration into Polish society has proven to be difficult in many cases (Weinar, 2003; Hut, 2002, Kozłowski, 1999).

[7] Data of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens: *http://www.uric.gov.pl/index.php?page=1090103000*

2. Legal and Policy Framework

According to Friedrich Heckmann and Dominique Schnapper, no European country has ever developed a "pro-active" and consciously planned "national integration strategy," or a "systematic and goal-minded action undertaken on a national level". Integration policies implemented in European countries usually take the shape of a "politically promoted process" that "sets conditions and gives opportunities and incentives for individual choices and decisions" to individuals who, in struggling to improve their social situation, adapt to the explicit and implicit rules of the "social order" (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003:10-11). In order to achieve upward social and economic mobility (in a legal and acceptable way), individuals must comply with the host society's institutions and, at the same time, be granted the possibility of accessing and participating in existing social structures. In other words, integration is about guaranteeing rights to migrants as much as it is about their duties as responsible members of their adopted country.

In the case of Poland, the scope of the incentives and opportunities provided to immigrants differs significantly depending on their legal status. Officially, integration policies implemented by the Ministry of Social Affairs are still aimed at only one group of migrants, a group that is, moreover, small in absolute terms: the refugees acknowledged by the Geneva Conventions[8]. In practice, however, certain legislative norms that have been enacted in Poland might be regarded as "indirect integration measures" (Hammar, 1985), for they do influence the scope of opportunities available to all migrants (and to his/her descendants) and, by the same token, can either facilitate or impede their inclusion in the host society's key institutions. For this reason, a reconstruction of the logic that determines the degree of access that immigrants have to public goods commonly available to Polish citizens will help to identify the "general integration praxis" that has been developed alongside the "official" integration policy addressed to refugees only.

2.1. Migrants and Their Legal Entitlements

Polish law distinguishes between different categories of migrants, with each group being entitled to different rights. The categories are the following: humanitarian migrants (refugees and tolerated stay), economic migrants (EU nationals and third country nationals), and repatriates. In line with EU directives, the legal entitlements of refugees and holders of tolerated stay permits are similar to those offered to migrants with a permanent residence permit.

[8] Hopefully, this position will change in the very near future, as the new concept of complex integration policy is being prepared by the Ministry of Social Policy.

2.1.1.Humanitarian Migrants

As already mentioned, refugees are the group of migrants officially entitled to the largest amounts of benefits from the Polish state; the most significant of these benefits is the so-called "integration programme". Assistance provided through the integration programme, which can last up to 12 months and is implemented by the *Powiatowe Centrum Pomocy Rodzinie*[9] (PCPR), includes "expert counselling", reimbursement for health insurance, and direct financial support[10] in the form of a monthly allowance[11] (for 12 months) that covers basic expenses (like accommodation, food, and clothing) and classes in Polish. The head of the PCPR assigns a social worker, charged with providing individual assistance and "mentorship", to a refugee; the social worker is expected to "cooperate with the refugee and support him/her in relating to the local social environment", help in securing appropriate accommodation, and undertake individually-designed actions aimed at the economic activation and social orientation of the refugee. In turn, the newly-arrived refugee is obliged to register as unemployed with the Labour Office and to then seek employment. Besides, he/she should attend Polish language classes and fulfil certain commitments agreed upon, on an individual basis, with the social worker, and meet with him/her at least twice a month. Should refugees not meet their obligations or leave the region where the integration program was implemented, they run the risk of forfeiting their right to receive individual help or/ and financial assistance[12].

Although integration programmes were invented and proclaimed as personalized and custom-designed schemes based on a careful assessment of migrants' needs, skills, and qualifications, the outcomes remain less than satisfactory in some cases. Inclusion in the labour market, a crucial factor for promoting integration, is proving to be the most problematic element. The main barrier to finding a job is refugees' weak proficiency in the Polish language and their inability to meet the qualifications required by local employers. Some challenges (for example, illiteracy or chronic illness), simply cannot be confronted adequately within a 12-month period. Those refugees who do not manage to find employment usually become regular beneficiaries of state social security services (c.f. Koryś, 2004: 54-57).

In fact, asylum seekers who have been granted refugee status have access to a wide range of rights and privileges, including the right to social and unemployment benefits[13], the right to run a business on the same terms as Polish citizens[14], as well as other entitlements, some of

[9] County Centers for Family Assistance
[10] The amount of financial allowance depends on the size of a refugee household. It ranges from 1,149 PLN (for a one-person household), to 420 PLN per month (Social Security Act of 12 March 2004, Art 92).
[11] The mutual obligations of a *Powiatowe Centrum Pomocy Rodzinie* and a refugee participating in integration programs, as well as the regulations concerning the size of financial allowances, are as listed in the Ordinance of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs dated 1 December 2000.
[12] The Social Security Act of 12 March 2004, , Art. 93-95.
[13] The Act on the Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions of 20 April 2004.
[14] The Act on the Freedom of Entrepreneurship of 2 July2004.

which cover their offspring (free education at any level[15] and health insurance). Another important advantage of having refugee status is that it opens up the chance of being offered a cheap, council-owned apartment (currently, this is a scarce commodity rarely available even to Polish citizens), thus significantly improving living conditions and alleviating pressures on the household budget[16].

However, the number of immigrants enjoying such privileged integration conditions is relatively small: between 1991 (when the Polish government signed the Geneva Conventions) and the end of 2003, only 1,764 people were granted refugee status in Poland[17], and 901 of them only became refugees after 1 January 1998.

Polish law offers asylum seekers two other forms of migrant protection. The first one, known as "tolerated stay", was introduced as a means to safeguard that relatively large group of migrants who were denied refugee status (because they failed to meet the criteria set out by the Geneva Conventions), but whose right to life, freedom, and personal security might be endangered in their country of origin. Some of these may also risk being subjected to torture or to inhuman and degrading treatment or to some other form of unacceptably harsh punishment[18]. Currently, this form of protection is granted mostly to Chechens who have fled to Poland.

The second form is called "temporary protection" and was intended as an immediate solution for foreigners "coming to Poland *en masse*" after having left their country of origin or a particular geographical region because "of alien invasion, war, civil war, ethnic conflicts, or serious human rights violations"[19]. Since its introduction in 2003, however, "temporary protection" status has not yet been granted to any asylum-seeker.

Recent changes in Polish law have broadened the entitlements available to "tolerated stay" holders so that this group of persons now enjoys almost the same privileges as refugees. However, tolerated stay holders are not guaranteed freedom of movement within the European Union and receive smaller financial contributions from state or local authorities. The maximum financial allowance available to migrants with "tolerated stay" status without other forms of economic resources amounts to approximately 100€ per month (420 PLN)[20]. Moreover, although this group of migrants does have free access to the Polish labour market, it cannot register as unemployed with the local Labour Office/ job centre (they can register as "employment seekers", which gives them access to a rather narrow range of services, traineeships, and other forms of relevant assistance programmes). On the other hand, these

[15] The Act on the Education System of 7 September 1991 and The Act on Higher Education of 12 September 1990.
[16] As the number of available council flats is far below demand, some refugees must rent their apartment on the free market.
[17] Approximately 30,000 asylum seekers submitted applications between 1993-2003.
[18] Act on the Protection of Aliens on the Territory of Poland issued 13 June 2003, Art. 97.
[19] Ibidem (Art. 106).
[20] The Ordinance of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, 16 April 2003

"protected" migrants are given free access to the Polish labour market (they do not need to apply for a work permit and are able to establish and run a business on the same terms as Poles and refugees) and their children can attend school under the same conditions as Polish citizens[21] (this is something that is offered to permanent residents and nationals of EU Member States working in Poland and their families, as well as to humanitarian migrants).

Another privilege granted to all types of humanitarian migrants (and permanent residents) is the right to social welfare and all types of social benefits (as long as the predefined criteria are met). The importance of this entitlement stems from the fact that customary beneficiaries of social security are covered by health insurance while other migrant groups, including permanent residents, are only entitled to health insurance if they are working or studying in Poland. Additionally, migrants with "temporary protection" status are to be provided with accommodation and board[22].

2.1.2. Economic Migrants

Among migrants arriving in Poland for reasons other than humanitarian ones, a particularly privileged group are EU nationals as well as the citizens of countries in the European Economic Area (EEA)[23]. Not only are they given access to social benefits, but they are also entitled to assistance in entering the labour market[24] and the education system (including university-level programmes).

The situation of third country nationals in Poland is more disadvantaged. First of all, in order to receive a restricted visa (issued with a restricted residence permit and valid for a maximum of two years), these individuals are required to prove that they are either: "engaged in [a] business activity […] profitable to the national economy"; in the process of gaining a work permit (something that is quite complicated, c.f. section on the Labour Market); be a "recognised, established artist" intending to "continue […] artistic activities on the territory of Poland"; or in Poland on the grounds of family reunification. Needless to say, only a few labour migrants from the former Soviet Union can meet these criteria, for they are usually employed in badly-paid jobs in the secondary labour market. For this reason, they sometimes resort to other means of legalising their residence: for example, by seeking admission into public and non-public universities (Koryś, 2004) or by marrying a Polish citizen (Kępińska, 2001).

[21] The Act on Higher Education does not grant recipients of a "tolerated stay" status to free university education (while it does to refugees and "temporary protection" immigrants). What looks, at first sight, like a loophole, might in fact be a conscious decision (prompted by the fact that migrants residing in Poland on the grounds of a "tolerated stay" status are likely to be much more numerous than those granted "temporary protection").
[22] Act on the Protection of Aliens on the Territory of Poland (Art. 111)
[23] These include all EU countries, as well as Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.
[24] EU nationals can register as unemployed and are entitled to unemployment allowance if they have worked in Poland for 18 months before becoming unemployed.

In applying for restricted residency, migrants must show proof of possessing sufficient financial means to cover living expenses in Poland. If applicants are so much as suspected of becoming a burden on the Polish welfare state, their requests are liable to be refused, which means that, until the necessary conditions are met, they must "rely on their own resources" while seeking employment, for example, and pay for services, like secondary and higher education, that are available to Polish citizens free of charge. As before, these requirements are not demanded of EU and EEA nationals. The acquisition of a permanent residence permit (in Polish law termed a "permission for settlement") marks a turning point in the legal status of foreigners and their access to key institutions in Polish society, for permanent residents enjoy the same rights as Polish citizens (and refugees), except for in the realm of voting rights.

Immigrants can apply for a permanent residence permit if they have lived on Polish territory for at least three years (as residents) or for at least five years (in the case of refugees or appropriate visa holders) and if they are able to point to the "existence of durable family bonds or economic ties with the Republic of Poland"; they must also document the possession of "accommodation and economic means" (in other words, they must prove that they are earning a fixed income and have secure lodging)[25]. The outcome of this regulation is quite paradoxical: migrants only gain legal access to social security and/or unemployment benefits once they can prove that they do not need it[26]. The criteria that must be met for applying for permanent residency are demanding. In fact, only about two thirds of applications for a permanent residence permit were accepted in 2001-2003; in the case of restricted residence permits, however, only one out of twenty applications were refused (the ratio of refusals varied according to nationality -- c.f. Table 7)[27].

2.1.3. Naturalized citizens

The acquisition of citizenship might be regarded as the final stage on the path to social inclusion. Although the Polish legal system complies with the principle of ius sanguinis (whereby citizenship is granted on the basis of family ties as opposed to place of birth), Polish citizenship is also available to foreigners who are in no way related to Poles, as long as they fulfil some prerequisite: applicants must have lived in Poland for at least five years with a permanent residence permit[28] and, in some cases, must renounce their previous (foreign) citizenship. Under very special circumstances, the President of the Republic of Poland has the power to grant citizenship regardless of non-compliance with these requirements. Although detailed data on the granting of Polish citizenship to foreigners is not published annually, it is possible to estimate that approximately 10,000 people became Polish citizens in the years 1990-2003 (most probably, this number also includes the restoration of Polish

[25] The Act on Aliens of 13 June 2003, Art.65

[26] Witnessing the moral panic of "scroungers who are seeking social benefits" and "living at the taxpayer's expense" that burst out in the UK after the EU enlargement, this regulation might be regarded as a far-sighted.

[27] Own calculations based on statistics of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens.

[28] An exception is made for the foreign spouses of Polish citizens – they can apply for citizenship after three years of living in Poland with a permanent residence permit.

citizenship to individuals who had previously lost their citizenship as children or who had given it up through marriage to a foreigner).

Table 7: Decisions on Permanent Residence Permits and Restricted Residence Permits Issued by The Office for Repatriation and Aliens, 2000-2003 (selected countries)

Country of Citizenship	Permanent				Restricted			
	Positive	Negative	Discontinued	**Total**	Positive	Negative	Discontinued	**Total**
Armenia	198	163	27	**388**	2,127	425	81	**2,633**
Belarus	183	75	15	**273**	6,316	151	61	**6,528**
China	100	32	2	**134**	1,177	48	24	**1,249**
Czech Republic	23	8	2	**33**	660	3	11	**674**
Denmark	5	7	1	**13**	706	4	7	**717**
France	23	6	1	**30**	3,492	16	65	**3,573**
Georgia	25	13	0	**38**	268	28	4	**300**
Germany	68	22	7	**97**	4,086	74	69	**4,229**
Hungary	8	2	0	**10**	291	1	5	**297**
India	58	21	0	**79**	1,469	68	23	**1,560**
Iraq	7	8	0	**15**	117	14	2	**133**
Italy	36	8	2	**46**	1,238	12	24	**1,274**
Japan	10	3	0	**13**	758	3	20	**781**
Jordan	15	8	0	**23**	224	13	3	**240**
Kazakhstan	32	12	1	**45**	1,358	17	32	**1,407**
Latvia	2	2	1	**5**	203	5	2	**210**
Lebanon	12	6	1	**19**	129	8	5	**142**
Lithuania	26	6	1	**33**	886	12	13	**911**
Moldova	16	2	0	**18**	697	25	6	**728**
Mongolia	41	48	7	**96**	776	81	20	**876**
Netherlands	21	5	2	**28**	1,029	10	17	**1,056**
Nigeria	10	5	3	**18**	332	28	9	**369**
Russian Federation	305	87	11	**403**	5,367	240	82	**5,689**
Serbia and Montenegro	32	22	1	**55**	672	13	22	**707**
Slovak Republic	10	1	0	**11**	547	3	10	**587**
South Africa	2	4	0	**6**	135	0	1	**136**
Spain	7	1	0	**8**	436	1	6	**443**
Sudan	9	10	0	**19**	56	4	1	**61**
Sweden	19	5	2	**26**	1,086	6	10	**1,102**
Syrian Arab Republic	24	16	3	**43**	439	37	7	**438**
Tajikistan	6	7	1	**14**	32	1	1	**34**
Turkey	31	18	4	**53**	1,454	106	40	**1,600**
Ukraine	686	229	39	**954**	19,461	709	237	**20,407**
United Kingdom	41	19	3	**63**	2,809	21	66	**2,896**
United States of America	45	15	6	**66**	2,875	11	65	**2,951**
Vietnam	436	210	14	**660**	3,141	402	69	**3,612**
TOTAL	**3,016**	**1,253**	**172**	**4,441**	**79,002**	**3,095**	**1,376**	**83,473**

Source: Office for Repatriation and Aliens

2.1.4. Repatriates

Unlike the other groups of migrants discussed in this chapter, repatriates[29] (descendants of Polish citizens who were forcibly resettled to one of the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union under Stalin's rule) can acquire Polish citizenship (and all rights and privileges linked to this status) at the very beginning of their integration process. Once they obtain an entry visa for repatriation issued by a Polish consulate and have arrived in Poland, they automatically acquire Polish citizenship (foreign spouses who of non-Polish origin are granted permanent residency); at the same time, they are defined as a separate group from other Polish citizens and are thereby entitled to certain extra benefits.

Although it is essential to maintain a certain degree of "Polish-ness" is one of the prerequisites for obtaining a repatriation visa (for example through the preservation of the Polish language, of traditions and folk customs), almost all repatriates suffer from serious *acculturative stress* [30] and need some assistance to help them reintegrate into the host society. In recognition of this "particularity", legal regulations[31] setting conditions for repatriation also define the scope and various forms of institutional assistance available to repatriates. By virtue of these, repatriates are provided with Polish language courses and orientation training (basic information on Polish culture, the legal system, employment and living conditions). Even more advantageous for repatriates is a guarantee of accommodation and maintenance (for at least 12 months) by the local authority of the *gmina* (commune) that issued an invitation to the repatriate's family. Repatriates are the only immigrants who are provided with their own apartment upon arrival in Poland, who can apply reimbursement of travel expenses, who may receive a special "settlement allowance" (up to 1,000€ per family member, for undertaking necessary renovations and equipping the apartment), and who are also entitled to a "school allowance" (equal to the average wage) for each child of school age.

Compared to those regulations that concern other groups of migrants (and, indeed, even Polish citizens), the set of norms that deals with promoting individuals' entrance into the workforce is very well developed. In accordance with these norms, the number of years of employment in the previous country of stay are taken into account when calculating the right to unemployment benefits and pension entitlements[32]. In addition, if a repatriate "has no possibility of taking up work independently", the *starosta* (the County Governor) of a given *powiat* (county-level administration) may refund part of the costs borne by a repatriate who seeks to raise his or her professional qualifications, as well as the costs incurred by employers who create job opportunities, offer appropriate re-training and "remuneration, awards and social insurance contributions"[33].

[29] The current repatriation wave concerns those Polish citizens (or their descendants) whose repatriation was not possible under the previous waves in 1944-1949 and 1955-1959.
[30] Psychological, sociological and physical health consequences of acculturation (see Berry 1992).
[31] The Act on Repatriation was passed in 2000 and amended in 2003.
[32] Act on the Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions, Arts. 72.4 and 86.2
[33] Act on Repatriation – consolidated text, Art. 23

A consequence of the very favourable integration measures offered to repatriates (above all, the fact that they are ensured a place to live and means of upkeep as soon as they enter Poland) has been that the number of individuals waiting to be repatriated exceeds the willingness of *gminas* to invite them (Kozłowski, 1999). In 2003, the 2000 Repatriation Act was amended to include the allocation of special grants from the central budget to local authorities as compensation for the cost of accommodating repatriates. However, a lack of data makes it difficult to assess whether this amendment has or will exert a significant influence in increasing the numbers of *gminas* willing to invite and then reintegrate the families of repatriates into their communities.

2.2. Social Institutions of the Host Society

As the above review of entitlements extended to different categories of immigrant makes clear, there are basically two main kinds of integration policy. The first ensures that repatriates, refugees, and EU nationals are given access to all (or most) municipal services during the initial phase of their integration. In contrast, the remaining migrant groups only earn the right to participate in certain social institutions, as well as to take advantage of certain services (like welfare payments and unemployment benefit), at an advanced stage of their integration process. Not only are the latter groups expected to demonstrate the "existence of durable family bonds or economic ties with the Republic of Poland", but they are also required to possess a considerable ability to "adapt" in the field of legal employment.

In general, immigrants' access to certain social institutions and to the scarce common goods distributed among the Polish population is limited. Notable exceptions to this rule are those groups of migrants that enjoy a "special" status because of their historical ties to Poland (as with repatriates), because of international law provisions (such as humanitarian migrants and refugees), or because of EU legal norms (affecting EU citizens). This somewhat "selective" approach has been adopted in most Central European countries: due to a limited resources and a high number of competing priorities, specific groups of immigrants are targeted so that assistance can be granted on a small scale and at relatively low cost (Iglicka, Okólski, 2004).

Principles that affect access to the labour market, the education system, welfare payments, and political participation are discussed in the sections below.

2.2.1 The Labour Market

Access to the labour market is one of the most highly protected and regulated privileges, and, for most immigrants, an essential means for legalising their residence status and for obtaining assistance from the social services (for education, health insurance, etc.). A foreigner wishing to work in Poland is obliged to obtain a work permit[34], which is issued by the *voivod* in which

[34] Exempt from this obligation are: refugees, those with the "tolerated stay" and "temporary protection" statuses, permanent residents, foreign spouses of Polish citizens, citizens of the United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland and Sweden (i.e. those EU countries that have opened their labour markets to Polish citizens) and their relatives,

the employer is located. In fact, it is the employer who applies for the permit, not the immigrant (it does not matter whether the employer is Polish or foreign, for the same principle applies to foreigners employed in foreign firms operating on Polish territory). There is a two-stage procedure by which an employer first obtains a pledge regarding the issue of a permit, on the basis of which the potential employee applies for a work visa or for a fixed-term residence permit[35]. In deciding whether to then issue a permit, the *voivod* (Governor of a Province) is bound to evaluating the situation of the local labour market -- in other words, to assessing whether there are other people among the registered unemployed who meet the qualifications of the foreigner in question. Only after the foreigner has obtained all the relevant documentation necessary for legalising his/her status can the *voivod* finally issue the work permit. It should be noted that these permits are issued for a set period of time, to a particular individual foreigner, for a defined post and type of work. The permit is valid for a maximum period of two years (i.e. the same amount of time as a one-off restricted residence permit). The cost of issuing the permit – borne by the employer – corresponds to the minimum work wage [36] or to half of that in the case of a permit's extension.

Confronted with a stubbornly high unemployment rate (c.20%) and relatively ineffective employment promotion programmes, most immigrants find it impossible to obtain unemployment and other welfare benefits. Unemployment benefits are set aside for repatriates, refugees, "permanent residents", EU nationals, and foreign relatives of Poles – on condition that they have worked for at least 18 months prior to application at an income level equal to or above the minimum wage and that they have made the necessary payments to the Labour Fund[37]. These, relatively privileged immigrants, may also register as unemployed and thereby gain access to job offers collected at employment centres, to training sessions run by the centres (with a view to improving professional qualifications), and to on-the-job training. Other groups of legal migrants (i.e. migrants granted "tolerated stay" and "temporary protection" status, holders of temporary residence permits, and relatives of EU nationals) can register as "jobseekers", which also allows them to take advantage of job offers at employment centres and to access different kinds of support services.
The situation for young people (including young migrants) entering the labour market is exceptionally difficult. Suffice it to note that youths aged 25 or under account for 25.4%[38] of the registered unemployed. In principle, no school-leaver or recent graduate is entitled to unemployment benefits (unless he or she has somehow worked for the required 18-month period – which is unlikely in the case of pupils and students). Although job centres and employers are prohibited from discriminating against anyone on the grounds of gender, age, disability, race, nationality, sexual orientation, political conviction, religious faith, or trade-union allegiances, it would seem that – in the face of such high levels of unemployment and

foreign students undertaking professional training, and members of certain professions like medical staff and athletics or football coaches.
[35] The Act on the Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions of 20 April 2004, Art. 88
[36] As of October 2004: 820 PLN (ca. 200 €).
[37] Act on the Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions, Art. 77 par. 2.
[38] Data of Central Statistical Office October 2004

fierce competition for posts – young migrants are going to find it very difficult to gain access to the primary labour market. And it is very likely that youths from certain well-defined ethnic groups are going to face even greater obstacles.

2.2.2 The Education System

Graphic 1: The Education System in Poland



Source: Ministry of Education

2.2.2.1.Primary Education

Gaining access to the Polish education system is of great importance when it comes to the integration of migrants' children, and is bound to gain even more importance when the time comes for these children to confront an extremely competitive labour market (as discussed above). In order to fulfil the so-called "educational obligation"[39], all children who remain on Polish territory are obliged to attend an educational institution regardless of their legal status. This legal provision is significant on account of the considerable role that educational institutions play in integrating foreign children (especially through the procurement of linguistic and cultural competence), and because of the negative effects on the development of children's intellect and personality occasioned by their non-attendance in school. Therefore, even the children of parents whose status has become "irregular" (for example through the overstaying of visas, or a failure to prolong a permit, or overdue tax payments, etc.) are able to enrol in public primary schools without any obstacles.

Despite these regulations, recent evidence suggests that some heads of schools have been reluctant to enrol immigrant children -- in particular, the children of refugees and of irregular migrants -- because, whether due to educational gaps, traumatic experiences, or a poor command of the Polish language, they probably require a lot of additional effort from teachers. To solve this problem, special funding has been secured at the local level for supplementary lessons in the Polish language. Following an Ordinance of the Ministry of Education[40], foreign pupils are now entitled to two hours of additional language courses per week (for a maximum period of one year); these are to be provided by the schools but funded by the local authority. Interestingly, the situation of immigrant children in schools has also improved due to current demographic shifts: the dropping birth rate and the movement of people away from the city-centre to the suburbs has meant that classes have been reduced and full-time teaching positions have been cut; consequently, schools in Warsaw have become very willing to take in foreigners' children[41]. A similar process is probably taking place in other urban agglomerations.

2.2.2.2. Secondary Education

Attendance in primary school and in the *gymnasium* (lower secondary school) is free of charge. In addition, humanitarian migrants, EU nationals, and permanent residents can choose to attend any other level or type of educational institution, while other kinds of residents are required to pay a tuition fee of 1,200€ per year for attending public secondary schools and 1,500€ per year for post-secondary schools. Some types of school (like art schools, for example) charge higher rates: 3,000€ per year[42]. These fees are defined by the Minister of Education, as are the charges for attending public secondary and post-secondary

[39] The Act on the Education System issued 7 September 1991
[40] The Ordinance of the Minister of a National Education issued 4th October 2001, Art. 6.
[41] Interview with the head of a city-centre Warsaw primary school.
[42] cf. the Ordinance of The Minister of Education, Art. 3.

schools. It is important to note that migrants are also permitted to attend private schools but that, should they choose to do so, they must pay the same fee as everyone else.

In theory, economic hardship should not constitute a barrier to education for immigrant children. In fact, migrant households that cannot afford the annual school fees may submit a claim for a waiver. Upon receipt of such a request, a school's governing authority (in most cases, a local authority) decides on whether to reduce the tuition fee, to split it into two payments, to allow for the payment to be deferred, or whether to waive the fee entirely[43]. In case of need, foreign and migrant pupils can also apply for a scholarship that is paid out monthly by the Ministry of Education[44].

Despite these possibilities, legal criteria for determining who is entitled to receive financial aid (whether in the form of fee reductions or scholarships) have not been defined clearly. Therefore, the kind of help granted (or denied) to applicants often depends on the decision of individual local authority officials, who may be influenced by unforeseen external factors like personal prejudice or budget shortages. Furthermore, immigrants might not be able to access financial aid either because they lack information (not all migrants are aware that they can ask for tuition fees to be reduced or waived) or because they lack "institutional competences" such as the ability to fill in the appropriate documents and deal with public administrative procedures. Unfortunately, no statistical data is available on the numbers of foreign pupils entitled to free secondary education, on those who do pay tuition fees, or on those who take part in additional language lessons[45].

2.2.2.3. Tertiary Education

Access to tertiary education is available to the following categories of immigrants under the same conditions as it is to Polish citizens: refugees; holders of "temporary protection" status; permanent residents; EU nationals (and their children) who are employed and pay taxes in Poland; and EU nationals studying in Poland, as long as they are able to cover their living expenses for the duration of their stay. Other kinds of foreigners can undertake university education in Poland if they have been awarded an inter-governmental scholarship (the yearly quota for this category is determined by the Ministry of Education), if they can pay for their own tuition fees, or, as for secondary schools, if their fees have been waived by the Ministry of Education, the dean of a university, or the head of an academic department.

The first group's right to study on the same legal basis as Polish citizens does not necessarily mean that education at public universities is free. In fact, only those students who pass the entrance exams with high grades are entitled to attend so-called "day studies"; students with less satisfactory academic achievements, on the other hand, are offered so-called "evening studies". Although the curricula available via these two educational routes are usually

[43] Ibidem, Art. 5.
[44] Ibidem, Art.8.
[45] Although these data should be reported to the Ministry of Education (under Art. 10 of the Ordinance)

similar, the latter must be paid for by all students, regardless of nationality, and might be regarded as less prestigious -- a detail that is important when the time comes to look for a job.

Given that large numbers of students compete for "day studies" (which have the double advantage of being free and more prestigious), criteria for entrance is highly selective. With regards to migrant children, especially those who arrive in Poland as teenagers with considerable educational gaps and linguistic insufficiencies, such competition may deny them the opportunity to pass exams and thus take actual advantage of the entitlement to free tertiary education (unless special measures like the granting of individual scholarships or free tuition are instituted). Interestingly, it is not only immigrants who face disadvantages in gaining free access to university courses: even prospective students from the Polish provinces encounter the same kinds of problems when it comes to finding a place in the prestigious, better-known academic centres. This situation is not really an indicator of discrimination, but, rather, it uncovers the severity of selection criteria applied (Bourdieu, Passeron, 1990) as well as differences in performance levels between the best secondary schools, usually located in large, academic urban centres, and those in the rest of the country.

Additional options are available in the wide and diverse range of tertiary education offered by private establishments. Notwithstanding the fact that these courses have to be paid for, private universities do provide some advantages to certain groups of foreign students: notably, through the provision of classes in English.

Teaching the Language and Culture of the Country of Origin The children of immigrants residing in Poland have the right to be taught the language and culture of their country of origin, as long as these courses are organised by a diplomatic institution or cultural/ educational association. If 15 or more children wish to attend these courses, then school directors are obliged, by law, to make classrooms available free of charge[46] and to designate a time and a day for the language/ culture lessons to take place (for a total of no more than five 45-minute lessons per week)[47]. Since the law only obliges schools to provide the premises, it is up to the relevant ethnic/ minority communities and/ or diplomatic missions to organise the actual teaching of the classes.

In this sense, immigrants from Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Germany are in a relatively favourable situation because the law states that Polish citizens who are at the same time representatives of ethnic minorities[48] are entitled to keep up their language, culture and national identity, including through classes in primary and secondary schools. The children

[46] The Act on the Education System, Art. 5.
[47] The Ordinance of the Minister of Education, Art. 7.
[48] Ethnic minority status is afforded to those ethnic groups who have lived on the territory of present-day Poland for at least 200 years. By law, therefore, Polish citizens of Vietnamese origin, for example, do not enjoy the entitlements connected to ethnic minority status.

of immigrants who settled in Poland in the 1990s may also attend these schools[49], although there are only a few such schools and they are not spread evenly throughout the country.

2.3. Social Benefits

Compared to the more developed countries of Western Europe, Poland is able to offer only a relatively modest range of benefits and resources to both Polish citizens and resident foreigners. The Polish welfare state's rarest and most desirable prize is the council-owned flat, something that is difficult even for Poles to obtain; thus, in the great majority of cases, citizens and foreigners alike are forced to compete for housing in the free market. As mentioned above, repatriates are the only group that is guaranteed such accommodation, although in practice they are often also made available to refugees (depending on whether the *gmina* in question has such housing resources at its disposal).

The right to health insurance and free medical care is extended to refugees, to asylum-seekers, to legally employed migrants and to migrants who are entitled to register as unemployed[50] and receive welfare benefits[51]. Welfare benefits (quite often the only livelihood resources available to refugees, repatriates, or individuals on "tolerated stay" who have failed to find employment) are very meagre and only barely sufficient to cover basic needs.

2.4. Political Participation

Only repatriates (on account of their being Polish citizens) enjoy the right to vote in presidential elections, in elections for the two houses of parliament (the *Sejm* and the Senate), and in local elections. Unfortunately, there is not enough data to establish the extent to which these rights are taken advantage of. All other migrants are denied voting rights until they assume Polish citizenship. Since 1 May 2004, EU citizens resident in Poland have been entitled to vote in elections for the European Parliament.

Like all citizens of the Republic of Poland, migrants enjoy the legal right to freedom of conscience, association, establishment, and peaceful assembly[52]. The degree to which different ethnic groups organise themselves, participate in civil society, and get involved in political activities varies quite markedly. The Vietnamese and Armenian diasporas are considered to be the best-organised groups, while also being the most closed to the host society. Of the other migrants, political refugees have, unsurprisingly, demonstrated the keenest interest in political activity (often by keeping up the "dissident" activity that forced them to leave their country of origin in the first place[53]). Some migrant organisations take

[49] Interview with a Ukrainian parish priest in Warsaw.
[50] Permanent residents, refugees, EU nationals and foreign relatives of Polish citizens.
[51] Refugees, holders of "tolerated stay" or "temporary protection" status, and permanent residents.
[52] As stated in the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland
[53] Two examples are: the Association of Belarussian Political Refugees and the Chechen Government in Exile.

advantage of the assistance and backup provided by Polish political organisations and political parties[54]; some of them even include Polish sympathisers among their ranks[55].

2.5. Bodies Engaged in Activities for the Promotion of Integration

Measures for the promotion of integration (i.e. the range of entitlements and financial resources made available to particular groups of migrants) are determined at the central level. The actual implementation of these measures, however, is carried out at the local level and is, in some cases, subsidized by local authority budgets. The scope and quality of benefits available to migrants may exceed the minimum requirements set out by the law: for example, some *gminas* may – at the request of schools – provide psychotherapy for the children of migrants from Chechnya, buy additional equipment for schools, or supply warm winter clothing in addition to merely giving language classes[56].

Assistance and integration activities carried out by Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are, in general, limited to humanitarian migrants and repatriates, although this approach has changed and other migrants groups are being gradually included[57]; they too are usually commissioned and funded by local authorities. The help they give is, first and foremost, connected to the provision of free legal assistance[58] and moral support, the organisation of Polish-language courses, the supply of accommodation, and the issuing of brochures and guides in a variety of languages aimed at improving living conditions by explaining the institutional setup and legal framework in Poland[59].

Another type of integration initiative is addressed at Polish citizens, the assumption being that a positive influence can be exerted on Polish attitudes towards immigrants, thereby facilitating foreigners' acceptance into the host society. Often, these initiatives take the shape of open-air "celebratory" events (for example: Refugee Day or Multi-cultural Week) where a certain culture or the traditions of a given group of migrants residing in Poland are exposed. These events typically include musical performances, samples of traditional dishes, and panel discussions on migration-related issues. They generally take place in large cities and academic centres, in part because NGOs working in favour of migrants' integration are located in big urban areas; migrants who live in more provincial regions, on the other hand, are mainly left to find their own way to integrate into the local community.

[54] Political Party *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* is known for its support to Chechen Government in Exile.
[55] Fore example, the Polish-Vietnamese Friendship Society
[56] In interview with a worker of NGO running refugee shelter.
[57] Caritas Poland offer its assistance to all migrants who address its Information Centres. The newly-established NGO ‘Proxenia’ also claims to undertake initiatives aimed at the integration of all migrant groups.
 Provided by Helsinki Watch Foundation and the Halina Nieć Foundation
[59] Polish Humanitarian Organisation

3. Identification of Factors and Indicators Relevant to the Integration of Migrant Youths

3.1. Methodological Limitations of Empirical Research on Migrant Youths

Certain difficulties and limitations were encountered in the course of this research project, due to the early stage of settlement of immigrants in Poland. The fact that most migrants have not been in the country on a permanent basis for very long has meant that it is difficult to seriously speak of, let alone study, the 1.5 and 2nd generations of migrants: foreign children born in Poland are, at most, only 10-12 years old at the time of writing, while most of the children born prior to the family's migration to Poland are only just completing their education and entering the labour market. Thus, it will be difficult to make an objective assessment of the degree of these youths' structural integration (or lack thereof) before they have been working for a few years. It is equally problematic, in the case of children, to measure their integration in terms of cultural and social dimensions since cultural adjustment and linguistic competence, as well as intensity of contacts with representatives of the host society may depend less on the children than on the actions of their parents. Finally, it is even more difficult to draw conclusions about the identificational dimension, since the period of most intensive identity formation and definition still lies ahead for many members of the group in question. A separate but connected issue concerns the ethical dimensions of studying children: there is, in fact, the danger that psychological 'wounds' may be reopened by questions that refer to traumatic past experiences.

A further barrier to research results from the need to conduct research from the standpoint of 'outsiders' (cf. Gans, 1999) since immigrant groups in Poland do not yet have their 'own' researchers: in other words, researchers whose ties to the community might allow them to better describe and analyse the group's specific behaviour (as has happened in the United States and in Western European countries). The picture that an 'outsider' is able to draw of a given group's functioning and integration is necessarily very different from the one that an 'insider', who has access to additional insight, is able to give. Unsurprisingly, the two perspectives may give very disparate images. The existing difficulties of studying immigrants from the standpoint of 'outsiders' is often exacerbated by the language barrier and/or by the interviewees' poor comprehension of the idea of social studies; unfortunately, this results in distrust in the researcher.

Despite all these obstacles, a methodology was devised that aimed at interviewing 'key experts' (adults in daily contact with migrant children, such as teachers, education counsellors, and parents) instead of the children themselves (see methodological note at the end of the report).

3.2. Indicators of Migrants' Integration

It is commonly agreed that the integration of migrants requires providing them with an equal chance to fully participate in the economic, social, and political life of the country, offering them the opportunity to benefit from the same living standards as the native population, and guaranteeing them the same freedoms, including the freedom to retain and develop their cultural and religious identity. The concept of full (or at last fair) participation presumes that if immigrants were not discriminated against and if they did not suffer the burden of additional disadvantages (such as a lack of fluency in the receiving country's language or inadequate education/ training), the degree of their access to crucial areas like the labour market, education, housing, benefits and services would reflect their presence in the population (Coussey, Christensen, 1997).

It is surprisingly difficult to assess the success and effectiveness of various integration policies and implemented measures. Despite numerous attempts at formulating a comprehensive list of integration indicators (see, for example: European Commission, 2004; Council of Europe, 1997; Cagiano de Azevedo et al., 1992), the results of such efforts remain questionable, both in terms of content and objectivity, mainly because even seemingly obvious indicators pose certain problems. For example: can the high unemployment rates recorded among migrants in many European countries really be considered as indicators of poor integration? Could this data not be considered merely as an indicator of insufficient qualifications? In other words, it is not wholly clear whether the high unemployment rate of immigrants is due to inadequate integration efforts or to poor skills (Werth et al., 1997). Bauböck (1994) claims that it is almost impossible to identify truly objective measures of integration because as any such assessment involves "normative background assumptions" about a desirable social order. As a result, discussion on integration usually dwells on "clashes about different political norms" rather than on the straightforward interpretation of social facts.

It has proven even more problematic to accurately assess the progress of integration and to identify factors that hinder and/ or promote that process in Poland because of the relatively small number of immigrants registered in statistical records and because of the "freshness" of the immigration phenomenon in the country. In particular, there is a clear lack of longitudinal data. Nevertheless, existing resources do allow for some comparisons between immigrants and the native population to be made; these concern employment, school enrolment, and crime rates.

Employment The few data sources that are available, like the 2002 Census, show that although immigrants' education level is, in general, much higher than that of the Polish population (35% of foreign residents have completed tertiary education, compared to only 9.9% of the general population), their ratio of economic activity was lower (38%) than that of Poles (54.8%). This source also reveals that the employment rate (36%) of long-term

immigrants (i.e. foreigners who have resided in Poland 12 months or more) is higher than that of short-term immigrants (21%) (i.e. foreigners who have resided in Poland 2-12 months) (Kostrzewa et al., 2003);and that the employment rate of the total Polish population is higher than that of either of these two groups (c. 44%) (Central Statistical Office, MRS, 2003). The 2002 Census also recorded that while over 64% of employed migrants were males, in the total population the male employment rate was of 50% and the female employment rate 38%. Almost 19% of migrants declared a source of income that was not work-related and 42% of them claimed they were sustained by other family members (approximately one third of males and one half of females in immigrant households claimed they did not participate in the labour market and were supported by another member of the household). The overall picture concerning the economic activities of immigrants in Poland would probably be different if a larger group of resident foreigners has been reached by the census officers (Kostrzewa et al., 2003). Unfortunately, data on the average income or on the housing and health conditions of immigrants compared to the total population has not been gathered or published yet.

Education An analysis of the educational choices made by immigrant parents for their children points to a relatively good economic situation among foreign families (c.f. Table 4, Section 1) : the vast majority (80%) of children eligible for secondary education attend general secondary schools (compared to 49% among the general population), which also means that they are more likely to continue their education to the tertiary level. Basic vocational schools were chosen by 3% of all immigrant children and by 13% of the total population, while secondary vocational schools were picked by 16% of immigrant youths and 38% of youths in the total population. Since both socio-economic position and average income are positively correlated with educational achievements, the overrepresentation of immigrant children in general secondary schools (assuming they will continue their education) means that for many of them upward mobility is possible and that they have good chances of becoming active in the Polish economy.

Crime Rate Existing sources on crime rates indicate that although the there has been an increase in the share of crimes committed by foreigners in the 1990s, this figure continues to remain below 2% of the all crimes committed in Poland (Rzeplińska, 2000). Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the increase in crimes that was registered in 1990s is mostly due to the rapid growth of cross-border traffic in the form of tourism, not to immigration. In fact, over 40% of all registered offences involved the smuggling of alcohol and cigarettes into Polish territory and almost 80% of all foreigners apprehended for such activities came from the neighbouring countries of Ukraine, Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Lithuania. In line with this trend, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Russians, and Armenians also feature prominently among foreigners convicted for more serious crimes like robbery or theft. Thus, it should be emphasized that the majority of foreigners who commit crimes in Poland are not immigrants but rather "visitors" who stay for only a few days (rarely do they remain for more that 30 days). The extent of criminal activities committed by foreigners in Poland should also be evaluated in a broader context: in Germany, for example, as many as 35% of all people

suspected of having committed a crime are foreigners (Albreht, 1997) in Sweden, the crime rate for immigrants is 2.5 times higher that in the whole population (Matrens, 1997)[60].

3.3. Dimensions of Migrants' Integration

According to the theoretical structure devised by Friedrich Heckmann (Heckmann, 1999), the process of integration that individuals and groups undergo can be analysed through four basic dimensions: institutional, cultural, social, and identificational. Although these dimensions can be clearly identified and concern different facets of life, they are also inextricably intertwined. This means that progress in one dimension can be either promoted or hindered by progress (or lack thereof) in another dimension: for example, obtaining a job in the primary labour market (institutional dimension) depends on language competencies (cultural dimension), which may, in turn, depend on the scope of an individual's social contacts and on the available opportunities to learn and practice the host society's language (social dimension). By the same token, insufficient language skills limit social contacts and may contribute to increasing one's sense of isolation and lead to ghettoisation and marginalization within an ethnic niche (identificational dimension).

3.3.1. The Institutional Dimension

As mentioned in Section 2, it is very difficult for the majority of migrants (asylum seekers and EU nationals being exempt) to prove that they possess the sufficient means of subsistence, in other words employment and accommodation, that is the basic prerequisite for legal residence in Poland. This requirement limits the number of non-humanitarian migrants who can cope with the host society's basic institutions (like the labour market) or who might seek assistance from Poland's welfare state structure as soon as they arrive. Such a policy also overlooks the existence of a vast group of irregular workers who are, in fact, self-sufficient and who often integrate into Polish society spontaneously. Since obtaining a labour permit requires the direct involvement of a future employer, migrants who do not have the support of a migrant-based network (as the Vietnamese do, for example), or who are not recruited by international enterprises, have little chance of getting legal employment in Poland upon arrival in the country. Which is why migrants who come to Poland looking for unskilled work usually undertake these posts illegally; this then excludes them from participating in the key institutions of Polish society.

Once they are illegal, it is difficult for people like domestic servants to regularise their residence status by seeking a legal work permit with an appropriate visa or a temporary residence permit. The Ukrainian women who were interviewed for this research reported that they were engaged in irregular employment for an average of three years before they found a family that was ready to arrange a work permit for them or before they had gained sufficient "institutional competence" and had generated enough savings to enable them to undertake

[60] Both references quoted in Rzeplińska, 2000.

self-employment in Poland. Since arranging legal employment for a foreign baby sitter or nurse is quite costly (in addition to the wage, employers must pay a monthly social security fee), there are very few chances of finding legal employment, even despite the considerable demand for this type of services.

Unlike economic migrants, refugees and repatriates have shown a tendency to remain dependant on assistance provided by the host society for a long time, with some of them becoming customary "clients" with few opportunities to overcome their difficulties and regain self-sufficiency. One reason why so many of them encounter serious problems in finding regular employment in Poland is that they do not have transferable skills (c.f. following sections). Another is that a high national unemployment rate results in an extremely competitive labour market. While it is true that seasonal irregular migrants also lack transferable skills, they are more competitive than refugees and repatriates because they tend to be more flexible and to work for lower wages; understandably, this "unfair competition" creates a situation that does not satisfy refugees and repatriates. Income gained from jobs typically offered to temporary/ seasonal immigrants might be attractive to Ukrainians and Belarussians because of the difference in purchasing power parity between Poland and their own countries, but they are hardly sufficient to cover basic expenses for someone living in Poland.

3.3.2. The Cultural Dimension

Gaining linguistic competence is crucial for progress in this dimension. Given the difficulties that many foreigners have in learning the Polish language, migrants from the neighbouring countries to the east -- Ukraine, Belarus, the Russia Federation -- are in favourable position: the similarity between Slavonic languages means that citizens of these countries find it relatively easy to achieve passive understanding of Polish. Migrants from this group usually learn Polish easily, and some of them may know the basics of the language and may be acquainted with Polish reality even before their first visit in Poland through Polish TV Channels. In addition, oral communication is often possible because older generations of Poles were taught Russian in public schools and still remember basic vocabulary. As the priest of a Greek Catholic Parish in Warsaw attended by Ukrainian migrants testified:

> Usually, those who come from western Ukraine understand pretty well. And they are able to get into close contact [with Poles]. They do not speak impeccable Polish, they make many mistakes while speaking, but they understand correctly and do not encounter serious communication problems[61].

Predictably, Russian citizens whose mother tongue belongs to another language group do not enjoy the same advantages: refugees and migrants from Chechnya, Georgia, or Armenia, for

[61] From an in-depth interview with the priest of a Greek Catholic Parish in Warsaw attended by Ukrainian migrants.

example, encounter greater difficulties in learning and understanding Polish, despite the fact that many of them also know Russian[62].

Knowledge of Polish sharply differentiates the Vietnamese diaspora in Poland. Usually, Vietnamese immigrants who posses a good command of Polish have studied at Polish universities and belong to a first wave of Vietnamese migration to Poland (Halik, Nowicka, 2003). Regarded as an 'elite' among their community, many of them have been able to establish legal enterprises and often represent their compatriots who do not speak Polish in relations between the Vietnamese community and Polish authorities and society. There are also many Vietnamese in Poland who have not acquired a working knowledge of Polish and who are able to make a living and survive in the new country thanks to the support provided by the Vietnamese diaspora. For example, there are Vietnamese-language presses printed and distributed in Poland that serve the community by informing them of important events and instructing them on how to deal with Polish regulations. Despite this support mechanism, a lack of linguistic competence (often combined with illegality) does marginalize some Vietnamese migrants in Poland and makes them more vulnerable to abuse by both their fellow citizens and by Poles[63].

Interestingly, the degree of linguistic competence achieved by men and women within the Vietnamese community in Poland (this is probably true of other migrant groups too) differs significantly: since women tend to work within households and Vietnamese-owned firms, they have fewer opportunities to practice Polish than men; consequently, women tend to have a weaker grasp of the language. Competency also varies according to age and, unsurprisingly, length of stay in Poland: Vietnamese children who were raised in Poland and attend Polish schools speak Polish fluently and often become interpreters for their parents in relations with members of the host society (for example, with school teachers). As the head of a lower secondary school in Warsaw commented, this can raise some difficulties:

> We tried to reach Vietnamese parents to discuss their children's problems, but those contacts were difficult. In many cases, the only possible interpreter was the Vietnamese child who was directly interested in the content of our conversation. It has sometimes happened that the Vietnamese community has come in support of the parents by providing an adult interpreter, but it is uncomfortable to talk about family problems in the presence of a third party. In general, it is difficult to talk about this with interpreters.

The existence of these kinds of problems were confirmed by the observations of an expert on the Vietnamese diaspora in Poland who was interviewed for this study:

[62] Poor knowledge and comprehension of Polish among Chechen refugees is often mentioned by Polish social workers implementing individual integration programmes.
[63] Vietnamese representatives often complain that their compatriots are harassed by Polish officials like policemen, public transport controllers, etc. but due to lack of communication skills are not able to submit any claims.

> Teachers complain that Vietnamese parents rarely contact them. In theory, there are few problems with children, so there is no urgent need for frequent contacts, but … teachers find Vietnamese parents to be unwilling to maintain the contact. Of course, they are ready to help, to provide class events with Vietnamese foods, etc, but there are problems with their personal involvement, with direct contact… The Vietnamese themselves see it in a different way. For sure, the language barrier is a problem: Vietnamese mothers come to parents' evenings with their children as interpreters, which is a source of difficulties, but they also often feel disrespected by teachers, treated as if "There is no point in explaining anything to her, she would not understand anyhow". This is not only simply a communication problem…

Similarly, migrants from Western countries (especially those who do not intend to stay in Poland permanently) have not shown much interest in investing time and effort into learning Polish or in getting acquainted with Polish culture (Szwąder, 2002) . Hence, they tend to send their children to private schools where classes are taught in English or French, thus limiting contacts with Polish society and language.

3.3.3. The Social Dimension

There is no doubt that insufficient language competencies seriously limit the scope and intensity of relationships between immigrants (and refugees) and host society members. The distance that this creates between the communities can be passed on from generation to generation: teachers and educational councillors who were interviewed in the framework of this research confirmed that Vietnamese and Polish children often interact only within the school environment and that this might be due to Vietnamese parents' wishes:

> A: In fact, Vietnamese children do not invite Polish peers to their homes.
> Q: But are they invited by Polish children?
> A: Yes
> Q: Do they accept these invitations?
> A: It depends. I realised some time ago that there is a ‘secret line [of behaviour]’, and that this line is set by parents (…) but, probably, as they grow roots here, peer groups will become increasingly important, more important even than [the line of behaviour demanded by] a mother or a father...

Low economic status may also affect the frequency and extent of personal contacts between members of a given ethnic community and people outside this community. One school psychologist, for example, described the case of a Ukrainian girl who joined the last class of primary school: since the girl's mother was working as a cleaner and could only afford basic necessities, the girl was not able to participate in a classroom 'vanity fair', where pupils showed off with trendy clothes and gadgets. Consequently, the girl's sense of isolation increased. With regard to difficulties in compensating for academic differences between the

Ukrainian curriculum (which she had been following before coming to Poland) and the Polish curriculum (which she was obliged to adapt to), and in overcoming communication problems, the girl's classmates found her socially unattractive and excluded her from informal social life.

Other teachers have noticed, however, that some Vietnamese pupils have tried to restore out-of-school contacts with their Polish classmates as their families achieve a better financial position:

> That is a new phenomenon [among] the Vietnamese who have settled here, who no longer rent one studio per two families, are starting to drive nice cars, are doing well, have achieved something, have large comfortable apartments or houses in the suburbs; that is when the mutual contacts, the invitations begin (…) at the begging they are probably ashamed of their poverty, of improvised arrangements, of cardboard boxes instead of furniture, but once their economic situation improves, then it changes…

The tendency towards collective living and forming large networks, typical of the Vietnamese and Armenians, have had a double-edged effect on the social functioning of these migrants. On the one hand, these networks provide the kind of support and resources that facilitate cultural orientation and adaptation in the host country; for example, they impart knowledge of legal regulations or the availability of financial loans (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). Moreover, migrant organisations formally and informally animate various forms of social life by providing multiple opportunities for meetings among compatriots, information exchange, the maintenance of a collective identity and cultural heritage, the celebration of national holidays etc. Obviously, immigrants from officially acknowledged ethnic minorities like the Ukrainians and Armenians are in a particularly privileged position because, although contacts between 'old' and 'new' diaspora members are rarely close and intense, newcomers can take advantage of the ethnic community's structures and institutions. For example, Ukrainian migrants may attend the social meetings organised by the Warsaw Greek Catholic Parish, as well as profit from the 'institutional competences' gained by compatriots who have been in Poland some time. And then there is the case of the Polish Armenians who, upon request of their newly-arrived fellow citizens, organised an ethnic school for Armenian pupils. As respected Polish citizens who were well-acquainted with Polish law and local institutional procedures, they were able to negotiate more favourable terms (such as free classroom space) than the Vietnamese ethnic school.

Charity football match between Polish actors and Vietnamese residents in Poland organized in Warsaw to celebrate the Vietnamese Independence Day.
Photo by Izabela Koryś

On the other hand, the existence of well-developed networks decreases new immigrants' motivation to establish relations with host society members and often 'punishes' community members who try to emancipate themselves from the network's influence:

> Vietnamese, Armenians, and Chechens start to develop something like… [to call it a] ghetto would be too much, but they do develop a closed social structure. […] This closed social structure is ruled by its own internal regulations. Within the structure, especially the Vietnamese and Chechen ones, there is an informal judiciary system, an informal leadership, an informal socio-political life. […] These groups are not aiming to integrate quickly into Polish society. Within these groups, there have even been cases of persecution of those countrymen who did not subordinate to dominant behaviour patterns or who started to integrate into Polish society. […] We are aware of such cases, we know about murders that have been committed within these groups, but it is very hard, practically impossible, to identify the killer. The group is so hermetic that, beside the corpses, nothing could be found[64].

3.3.4. The Identificational Dimension

Because this dimension is the most 'subjective', it is also the most difficult to assess. However, it can be said that, in general, immigrants do not neatly change from identifying with their country of origin to identifying with their adopted country: rather, with time, they develop a new, dynamic, multi-cultural identity. A similar tendency has been observed in other European countries: here too, the children of immigrants develop bicultural, hybrid identities instead of adopting the majority identity (Curl, Vermeulen, 2003). This is all the more true for children and adolescents, who, precisely because of their young age, feel the influences of both countries in the process of self-construction most acutely. One Vietnamese teacher described a group of Vietnamese pupils as follows:

[64] Interview with a High Official of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens.

> I call them 'banana children' because they have yellow skin but are white inside. […] Vietnamese children must not be treated as Vietnamese nationals but as Polish children of Vietnamese origin. Above all, because they speak Polish and think in Polish. They speak Polish with their Polish baby sitters. They prefer to communicate in Polish because it is easier for them […] And they see Aleje Jerozolimskie and Marszałkowska [main streets in Warsaw] as more friendly places than a meadow in Hanoi. They consider visiting their homeland just as they would a trip to Venice or Tunisia: [Vietnam is] just another exotic place…[65]

Polish teachers have also confirmed that Vietnamese children[66] and youths who were raised in Poland seem to incorporate Polish elements into their identificational structure. Nonetheless, the extent to which these children include elements of Polish culture into their identity differs widely among various groups and depends greatly on the orientations and attitudes of their parents:

> As a community, they [the Vietnamese] have to struggle to maintain their children's national identity. […] I have observed those slant-eyed toddlers run down corridors and play in Polish, even though their companions are also Vietnamese. All these children have Vietnamese parents but they play among themselves in Polish. You cannot tell the difference between the way a nine or 10-year-old Pole plays and the way Vietnamese children play. So I think that the problem of their integration will be secondary to the problem of preserving their Vietnamese identity.
>
> […]
>
> I think that much depends on the atmosphere at home. [In other words, on] whether Poland is regarded as a transit country, a country for making money, or as a new homeland. That's the main factor that impinges on their identification. There are children who function perfectly in society, are fluent in Polish language, but [who continue to] say "that is yours, ours is different". Those children who have great ambitions and plan their future in other countries, or are going to study abroad, function completely differently…[67]

An important factor that influences the identificational process is the level of inclusiveness and the attitudes held by the host society and its members towards immigrants. If immigrants are constantly reminded by host society members that they are "different" from the rest of society (and that their "otherness" is regarded as a social stigma), or if they are persecuted or insulted because of visible minority racial features, it is much less likely that they will take on a new identity. For example, almost half (42.4%) of repatriates participating in orientation trainings have complained that they were rudely "reminded" that they were "second-class Polish citizens" by their acquaintances or employers. It comes as no surprise, then, that only

[65] Interview with a head of a Vietnamese ethnic school in Warsaw.
[66] Since Vietnamese children are the only relatively large and visible group of immigrants in Polish schools, teachers were not able to provide general observations concerning the assumed identificational affiliations of other ethnic groups.
[67] Interview with a teacher of lower secondary schools attended by numerous Vietnamese students

44.4% identified strongly as Poles and that 45.1 % felt they were "somewhat" Polish, while others claimed other identifications (Sochocki, 2003).

Although cases of racial persecution in Poland have, so far, been sporadic and involved relatively few people[68], non-European migrants, especially Vietnamese migrants or African refugees, are sometimes exposed to mistreatment by Polish citizens. On the contrary, migrants who can easily disguise themselves among the majority population because they lack distinctive racial traits are less likely to be targeted by xenophobic prejudices; the identificational shift towards the host society is thus facilitated. This mainly concerns migrants from the neighbouring countries of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation).

> I think that the Ukrainians who settle down here and who get married with Polish citizens end up integrating into Polish society so well that they lose contact with their Ukrainian roots… Last year, I received a call from the Warsaw Catholic parish about some Ukrainian parents who wanted their child to do his or her First Communion in a Catholic church, with other children, but who did not know the rules of the Greek Catholic Church. I answered that, according to Church law, the child should do the First Communion here, but the parents did not agreed to that: they wanted to immerse [themselves into Polish society] to the greatest extent possible, to lose their distinctive features, to no longer be described as Ukrainians…[69]

Although, in some cases, it may be impossible to rid oneself of these 'distinctive features' completely, research shows that immigrant youths do try to adjust to the majority:

> Why do Vietnamese pupils fit perfectly into the Polish education system? Because they do not ask questions, are polite, say good morning, wear neat clothes, obey teachers' orders, do not raise any questions or doubts. Given that Vietnamese children do not have any questions or doubts -- but this is just my own interpretation -- I think that they simply do not want to make themselves visible. Their anthropological characteristics are strong enough to discourage them from emphasizing [additional] differences. They do not want this. They avoid speaking about their homeland culture or language, they do this really reluctantly[70].

Another widespread method adopted by Vietnamese children to 'melt into' the majority group is that of adopting a typically Polish first name, a practice that is also picked up by Polish teachers and classmates because they often have problems pronouncing the Vietnamese name correctly. Interestingly, however, the head of one of Warsaw's secondary lower schools prohibited this practice by insisting that all immigrant children be called by their legal names.

[68] Hillman (2001) reports that in the 1990s Vietnamese migrants living in former East Germany "stopped using public transport and had to fear racist attacks when in public or searching for housing". In 1995, half of this Vietnamese community stated that it had had contacts with hostile natives and that they had met with discrimination in housing and employment matters. In Poland, the scale of racist attacks has never reached such levels; in fact, the UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) and officials from the Office for Repatriation and Aliens have confirmed that Polish rates are lower that in other CEE countries.

[69] Interview with the priest of a Greek Catholic Parish in Warsaw

[70] Interview with an expert on the Vietnamese ethnic group residing in Poland

Hopefully, this kind of regulation will become more popular as the number of migrant children in Polish schools grows.

Migrants from EU countries do not have to struggle to lose their 'distinctive features' because Poles do not, in general, regard these features to be inferior to their own.

3.4. Factors Relevant to the Integration of Migrants

Integration is a complex and long-lasting process that requires commitment and effort from both immigrants and the receiving society. Therefore, the outcome and the timing of that process depend on factors related immigrants' personal and group characteristics as much as they are on factors related to the institutional and social environment of the host country. Concerning immigrants' personal characteristics and the particular features of the group she/ he belongs to, the following factors can be identified:

3.4.1. The Extent to Which Human Capital can be Transferred From the Country of Origin to the Host Country

According to economic approaches to migration theories, integration (hereby measured in terms of labour market adjustments in the receiving country and the wage gap between the native and immigrant populations) depends on the international transferability of human capital. The extent to which human capital can be transferred between two countries depends on the types of skills possessed by individuals, on the similarities between the sending and receiving countries (with regards to language, culture, labour market structure, and institutional setting), and the reason for migration (i.e. economic or non-economic).

This theory assumes that economic migrants plan their movement and invest, in advance, in the transferability of their human capital by adjusting it to the specific needs of the receiving country's labour market. On the other hand, it is assumed that non-economic migrants such as asylum seekers and refugees do not, typically, plan their migration and therefore do not invest in advance in the transferability of their human capital. Consequently, asylum seekers and refugees are likely to exhibit greater earnings disparities than economic migrants do in comparison to natives (Bauer, Lofstrom Zimmerman, 2000). This theoretical assumption is confirmed in Poland, where refugees seem to suffer from the greatest 'devaluation' of human capital: educated refugees encounter considerable difficulties in having their professional qualifications acknowledged and few of them ever manage to find employment in their field. As a result, at least at the beginning of their occupational career in Poland, they tend to earn considerably less than Poles. Similar difficulties are encountered by repatriates: some of them have had to accept posts far below their previous occupational position (Najda, 2003; Sochocki, 2003) because no vacancies matching their skills and professional qualifications were available in the *gminas* where they settled.

3.4.2. Age of Immigrants

Another factor that influences the economic integration of immigrants is their age. As the economic theory outlined above predicts, older immigrants tend to invest less in honing their skills to meet the human capital needs of a specific country than younger immigrants do, primarily because they have a shorter working lifespan in which to collect the returns from these investments (Bauer, Lofstrom Zimmerman, 2000). As mentioned in Part One (c.f. statistical overview), most migrants coming to Poland are between 25-55 years old. The influx of older migrants usually results from family reunification, return migration, and repatriation. It is worthwhile mentioning that, due repatriates' severe difficulties in adapting socially and, above all, economically, into Polish life (Hut, 2002), some academics have suggested limiting repatriation possibilities to younger people and assisting older would-be repatriates in their country of residence instead of resettling them (Okólski, 1998).

3.4.3. Planned Length of Stay

This theoretical model also assumes that temporary migrants will have fewer incentives to make human capital investments in the receiving country than permanent migrants, because their expected life-time returns from these investments will be lower due to a shorter stay (Dustman, 1993). This assumption holds true for refugees and asylum seekers in Poland, a majority of whom would like to move to Western European countries, whether legally or illegally. Since they plan on continuing their journey, most of them do not 'waste' their time, money, and energy on learning Polish or even on monitoring their children's education in Polish schools.

As mentioned in previous sections, some migrants might find temporary, circular migration to be the only way of entering and working in a given country. Although circular forms of migration may appear as 'an easy and accessible option' for economic migrants from neighbouring countries, in the long run this usually leads to social marginalization in both the sending and receiving communities (Osipowicz, 2001).

3.4.4. The Existence of Ethnic Enclaves

Theoretical and empirical evidence collected in a number of countries confirms the negative effect on integration of large ethnic enclaves: the larger the ethnic enclave in the receiving country, the lower the returns from country-specific human capital investments and the lower the level of assimilation with the natives (Borjas, 2000). The inclusion of immigrant children and youths into the local education system seems to counterbalance the 'isolationist' effect caused by large ethnic enclaves.

3.4.5. Cultural Patterns

Cultural patterns that identify which values are desirable and which goals are to be achieved by an individual within a certain immigrant group necessarily also shape interpersonal relations between the 'in-group' and the 'out-group' and influence economic performance and integration level. The tendency for a group to privilege individualistic over collective values,

for example, affect all areas of social and economic life; similarly, social rules regarding the acceptability (or non-acceptability) of certain interpersonal relations may either facilitate or impede the establishment of contacts between the two groups:

> I observed one Ukrainian family [in a refugee reception centre] that immediately established personal contacts [with Poles]. They went somewhere and instantly made friends with the people they met, while the refugees from Chechnya did not. Chechens stick to one other and prefer their own companionship. They do not exhibit the same ease in approaching unknown people and in establishing personal relations that Ukrainians do[71].

Also, culturally-determined attitudes towards children's education profoundly influence young migrants' educational achievements:

> We had a Chechen girl, [she was] a very bright pupil. One day, she came to me and announced that she would not go to school because her parents were expecting guests and she had to clean up the house. This means that, since she was the oldest girl in the family, her mother was using her as an assistant for doing the house work. It is part of the tradition and culture of this nation for girls to help at home, it is considered more important to bake cakes and to cook some dishes than it is to attend school. […] Residents in our reception centres give different excuses for staying off school. For example, that they do not have proper shoes, or that it is raining. For them, these are sufficient reasons not to send their children to school[72].

The most influential factors currently affecting the integration process of immigrants into Polish society seem to be: the education system and the host society's dominant attitudes towards immigrants.

3.4.6. The Education System

The extreme importance of effectively incorporating immigrants' children into the education systems is obvious: by attending schools, children learn Polish, gain cultural competencies, and obtain skills that they will later be able to utilise in the labour market. Moreover, going to school enables immigrant children to establish direct personal contacts with members of the host society. And, last but not least, it should be stressed that good academic results are strongly correlated with economic self-sufficiency and generational upward mobility.

Perhaps due to the small proportion of migrant children compared to the native population, no problems have emerged from the presence of foreign children in schools. Since there are rarely more that 20 foreign children enrolled in any one school (on average, there are 0-5 foreign students enrolled per school in the Warsaw area), the danger of the informal segregation of schools attended by immigrants from those targeted exclusively to the native

[71] Interview with the worker of the refugee shelter.
[72] Interview with the worker of refugee shelter.

population is low. Quite to the contrary, it would seem that a higher concentration of migrant students promotes the development of good practices that facilitate migrant pupils' integration. As a result, immigrant parents tend to send their children to schools known for their friendly and welcoming environment and for their active promotion of tolerant attitudes towards immigrants by teachers and native students alike[73].

It is common practice to assign one migrant child per class. Although this may prove stressful for children with poor Polish-language communication skills, the dispersion of migrant children does fasten the establishment of personal relations between all classmates and accelerates the learning of Polish.

This latter aspect is all the more important in the light of the widely-recognised fact that poor language skills severely and negatively affects academic performance in all fields. While migrant children from mixed marriages who have been brought up in Poland or have attended Polish primary schools rarely face any problems in following the curriculum, students who join the education system at an advanced stage without good command of Polish encounter serious difficulties in keeping up with the rest of the class. For this latter group of students, the initial language barrier limits their comprehension and participation in lessons, thus obstructing their process of adjustment to the new environment. Even when provided with additional language lessons, these children are not able to make up for their insufficiencies quickly enough to keep up with the curriculum. While teachers are often more lenient because they are aware of the difficulties, final scores in standardized tests at the end of primary school, in the gymnasium (secondary lower school), and in entrance tests to the lyceum (secondary upper school) are lower. It should be noted that since Polish schools are rated according to their pupils' final test results, some headmasters might avoid enrolling 'potentially troublesome' children into their schools.

From the perspective of local education staff, the children of refugees and asylum seekers are the most 'troublesome', which is why they may encounter the most problems in successfully incorporating into the education system. Apart from the language barrier and the sometimes vast educational gaps occasioned by travels and lengthy asylum application procedures, the children of asylum seekers located in reception shelters can hardly afford all the expenses connected with school, including textbooks and stationary items. Given that many asylum-seeking parents are only vaguely interested in their children's academic progress (especially for as long as their applications are still being processed), it is hardly surprising that refugee pupils experience an uncommonly high dropout rate. In some schools, teachers who 'anticipating' a low level of interest by children and their parents in school attendance do not pay much attention to those children's achievements and even write down their names in pencil, so they can be easily removed from official documents if the children abandon the school.

[73] Interview with the head of a consortium of private lower and upper secondary schools in Warsaw

Additional challenges are raised by the distressing experiences that refugee children have often been through: children who have suffered through shock and trauma require a proper diagnosis and the kind of psychological therapy that often overextends the capacities of an average public school:

> We had a girl from Chechnya, she had been through some nerve-racking experiences. She witnessed terrible things over there in Chechnya, so she was seriously ill, she was losing weight - it was apparently post-traumatic stress disorder, a common problem. The whole family was affected by the same stress. She had looked on, with her own eyes, as Russian soldiers swung a boy her age and thrown him into a burning school.
>
> Ahmed did not attend primary school in Chechnya because his parents were wealthy and were afraid that Russians would kidnap the children of Chechens for ransom. So, in fact, he did not know what it meant 'to go to school' and he is still unable to concentrate during a lesson. He and his brother are so careless… They have changed a little, but when they were in their first year of gymnasium they behaved as if they were in their first year of primary school. They were just physically unable to sit at a desk for 45 minutes[74].

Even when municipal authorities are ready, upon the request of the school, to cover additional psychological therapy costs, children's parents sometimes neglect its importance and do not cooperate with the assigned therapist, or even fail to take their children to the appointments[75].

3.4.7. Attitudes of the Host Society

Both sociological research studies (Nowicka, Łodziński, 2004) and polls carried out in Poland document a gradual change in the way in which Polish citizens think of foreigners and immigrants. This shift towards less xenophobic and more tolerant attitudes results, most probably, from a growth in the number of direct personal contacts between Poles and immigrants, and from the positive portrayal of immigrants in the media[76]. As an expert in press discourse noticed in 2002, foreigners who received coverage in the media were largely presented in a very positive light (this was true in 63% of all articles): they were depicted as "ambitious", "creative" people whose contributions to society were deemed valuable. This study showed that, in describing immigrants, journalists tended to emphasise personal features and qualifications that are highly appreciated by Poles and that they omitted characteristics or facts that might be disapproved of by readers (Mrozowski, 2002: 231; Mrozowski, 1996).

Concerning the increase in personal contacts between the "native" and the "foreign" population: in 2004, almost one third of all Poles (30%) declared that they personally knew at least one foreigner residing in Poland, while only one quarter (25%) could say the same in 1999. The level of contacts is most intense in the country's large cities and among young,

[74] Interview with the teacher of the private lower secondary school in Warsaw.
[75] Interview with the employee of an NGO running a shelter for asylum seekers.
[76] For discussion see: Grzymała Kazłowaska, Okólski, 2003.

highly educated persons (CBOS, 2004). Despite an overall increase in tolerance, however, it is clear that not all nationalities are treated with equal amounts of sympathy. Poles demonstrate the greatest degree of acceptance towards foreign residents who are perceived as benefiting their economy, in other words citizens of 'developed' countries and, to some extent, citizens of the Czech Republic and Lithuania. Nonetheless, the percentage of Poles who consider economic factors -- above all, foreign investments and job creation -- as important in evaluating the benefits brought by foreigners has decreased in recent years, from 59% in 1999 to 46% in 2004. Interviewed Poles declared that they appreciated the wide range of cheap goods available thanks to migrant trading and that they valued the positive role played by foreign specialists in modernising the Polish economy, in transferring know-how, and in improving the country's corporate culture. Some recognized the value of cash inflows and of a competitive supply of foreign labour. Notable is the increase in the percentage of Poles who welcome foreigners' cultural input (27% in 2004 compared to 13% in 1999), particularly in the areas of tradition, cooking, and customs. More and more Poles also value diversity as a chance to open up to other cultures and nations, and as "an opportunity to learn tolerance and overcome prejudices" (CBOS, 2004).

As for the major threat associated with the inflow of immigrants, 36% of interviewees identified the increase in competition on the labour market caused by irregular workers, 20% pointed to the spread of organised international criminal networks (including drug dealing but also begging, etc.), and 5% were worried by the additional expense to the state budget associated with welfare benefits (CBOS 2004).

Table 8: Acceptance of Foreign Workers in the Polish Labour Market, Selected Years

Should foreigners be allowed to take up employment in Poland?	**Oct. 1992 (%)**	**Sep. 1999 (%)**	**Aug. 2004 (%)**
Yes, they should be allowed to take up any type of employment.	9	18	31
Yes, but they should only be allowed to take up certain types of employment.	39	46	42
No, they should be forbidden from taking up employment in Poland.	42	31	22
I do not know.	10	5	5

Source: CBOS 2004

With regard to the first point, i.e. to the fear of increased competition for employment, Poles appear to have become more accepting of foreigners finding work in their country over the last 12 years. As Table 8 demonstrates, in 1992 only 9% of the population agreed that all foreigners should be allowed to work in Poland, 39% accepted the presence of foreigners in a limited range of occupations, and as many as 42% called for a complete ban on the employment of foreigners. By 2004, this situation had changed: 31% of Poles accepted the

unrestricted employment of foreigners in the Polish economy, 42% would prefer some restrictions to be imposed on migrants' access to work, and only 22% said they would like to deny migrants employment. Interestingly, despite the fact that migrant workers may compete with the native labour force, acceptance of their employment is higher among Polish employees than it is in the overall population (c.f. Table 9).

Table 9: Acceptance of Foreign Workers in the Polish Labour Market in 2004, by Occupational Status of Respondents

Should foreigners be allowed to take up employment in Poland?	**Whole Sample (%)**	**Employees Only (%)**
Yes, they should be allowed to take up any type of employment.	31	43
Yes, but they should only be allowed to take up certain types of employment.	42	41
No, they should be forbidden from taking up employment in Poland.	22	11
I do not know.	5	5

Source: CBOS 2004

4. The Impact of Migrant Youths on the Host Society and Vice Versa

Undoubtedly, the temporary and circular migration of Polish citizens to Western countries constitutes the most important channel for the international exchange of money (mainly through remittances); of know-how and technological/ expert knowledge; as well as of cultural patterns. It is mainly through such exchanges that Poles have been exposed to the capitalist work ethos needed to strengthen a market-based economy and democratic institutions in Poland.

Although the number of immigrants who have settled in Poland is still too small to have made a systematic and visible impact on Polish society, the recent introduction of new foods, of oriental sports, of meditation practices, and of the use of natural medicines may well be due to the presence of foreigners. In actual fact, however, it is impossible to accurately state whether these new factors come from an influx of Asian immigrants or whether they result from a global trend that is receptive to oriental philosophies and lifestyles.

4.1. The Impact of Migrants on the Host Society

Although not the most numerous, the group of migrants that has been most influential in bringing about socio-economic changes to Poland is the one composed by highly qualified Western specialists (most of whom are either managers or technical experts). These specialists have brought with them the principles of a new, global, economic order as well as practical knowledge on how to implement relevant policies. Proof of the fact that Western experts have managed to transfer economic knowledge and corporate culture to the Polish labour force lies in the decision taken by some global concerns to locate their Central European offices in Poland, having found Polish branches to be the most productive in the region. Moreover, as demanding consumers, EU migrants contribute to the constant development of services and the improvement of standards. As the teacher of a lower secondary school in Warsaw testified:

> The people who come to work here are often well educated and very demanding, so they are sometimes troublesome for the education system. Public education may not meet their expectations. My friend from Zabrze [a medium-sized town in Silesia] told me of a Japanese man who managed a large enterprise there and who brought his daughter to the kindergarten she [the friend] worked in. She was surprised at what an incredibly demanding parent he appeared to be. He visited the kindergarten every day; he walked through the kindergarten and watched everything; he was very nice and polite, but he asked about everything. "Why," he asked, "do children not talk to one another when they play together? Children should be taught how to enter into a dialogue." None of the Polish parents ever visited the classrooms or complained that the children were not talking to each other. His suggestions

> were reasonable but he was a very difficult client, and the Polish education system will have more and more clients of this type. In fact, the education system should take advantage of them, since there are so many things one can learn from a parent like him.

The supply of a cheap migrant labour force has changed the shape of households in large cities: migrant domestic workers now make up for an insufficient number of nurseries, kindergartens, and elderly care centres while seasonal agriculture workers improve the competitiveness of farms. In many cases, migrants and their Polish employees establish long-lasting relationships that can lead to the legalization of the immigrants' status in Poland and to receiving substantial help in meeting all official requirements for the acquisition of necessary permits.

The temporary migration of language teachers has undoubtedly improved the knowledge of foreign languages among Poles: for example, the presence of language teachers from Ukraine in rural and small-city schools makes it possible for students who would otherwise be deprived of this opportunity to learn Western languages, thus also helping somewhat to assuage the imbalance in the quality of education provided in urban and rural regions.

Other migrant groups have found and expanded other economic niches: for example, the Asian and Turkish communities have become known for their cheap fast-food joints and restaurants, or for importing cheap textiles etc. What is worth noticing is that, by operating in ethnic niches, these migrants do not compete for regular positions on the primary labour market, but create additional jobs and contribute to the enlargement of the whole market.

While the influence of immigrants on the Polish economy is relatively easy to identify, it is a little harder to gauge the extent to which culture has been affected. While it is true that, ever since World War II Poland has been a rather homogeneous nation with regards to language and religion, the influx and settlement of Vietnamese and Chechen migrants (among others) will certainly contribute to diversifying Polish society.

4.2. The Impact of the Host Society on migrants

Temporary and circulatory migration flows to Poland probably play a similar role to that of Polish migrations to Western countries: through remittances, they improve the living conditions of households in the country of origin; they allow migrants to gain know-how and accumulate the capital necessary for the establishment of an enterprise in the country of origin; they substitute or assist underdeveloped banking systems. At the same time, Ukrainian and Belarussian migrants are able to see Poland as a country that has made the change from socialism to a capitalist, free-market economy; this may, in turn, promote the idea of democratization in Ukraine and Belarus. In fact (although it is rather impossible to prove without the shadow of a doubt), the temporary migration of Ukrainian citizens to

Poland, which will have exposed them directly to the advantages of living in a free-market economy, may have contributed to the spread of pro-European and pro-democratic attitudes that have played such an important role in the so-called 'Orange Revolution' that led to the election of pro-democratic and Western-oriented president Victor Yushchenko.

The impact that the host society has on migrants is bound to be multidimensional and to involve both disadvantages and benefits. For example, Vietnamese youths who have been raised and socialized in Poland run the serious risk of being marginalized when and should they return to their country of origin. Language is a clear problem area: children must learn Vietnamese very young (some Vietnamese teachers claim they must do so before they are seven years old), or they will not lose their foreigner's accent. Immigrant children, however, are often looked after by Polish caregivers and therefore learn Polish as their first language. Furthermore, Vietnamese children who are raised away from their country of origin are not able to benefit from the social network that is so important for social integration into Vietnamese society and that is absolutely essential in looking for employment. Since migration breaks this net of informal connections, Vietnamese migrant youths brought up in Poland have little chance of finding satisfactory, well-paid jobs in Vietnam or of achieving high social standing.

> Life in Vietnam is tough; because of the climate but, above all, because of the different interpersonal relations: you need personal connections, like in China. If you do not have proper connections, you will not achieve considerable success, because the finding of a good job depends primarily on your connections. The country is poor and [rates of] foreign investment are insignificant. Besides, there are so many young, talented people over there. I would have great difficulties in finding a job there. I mean a good job: I could find just any job, but I am not interested in washing dishes at a restaurant. It is very difficult for a person from abroad to find a position, especially without the support of relatives or parents' acquaintances. And those who left Vietnam have already lost their social connections[77]…

With regard to the high rate of unemployment in Poland and the still limited chances that Vietnamese youth have of entering the primary labour market, it is highly probable that the next generation of Vietnamese youth will try to migrate to Western countries, after having been 'pushed out' by the 'glass ceiling' encountered in Poland. As a Vietnamese migrant who graduated from university but then failed to find a job in Polish firms or public sector stated:

> You know, Polish society does not accept strangers. And if they really have to choose, they prefer a German over a Vietnamese. […] Vietnamese parents pay large amounts of money to send their children to the United States, to the United Kingdom, or to Denmark because they [the children] are not able to find a job here. I also had big problems in finding a job here.

[77] Interview with a head of a Vietnamese ethnic school in Warsaw.

The difficulties encountered by Vietnamese youths who wish to operate outside their ethnic community's economic niche and enter the primary labour sector do not, however, result purely from race discrimination or ethnic prejudices in Polish society (although these might, of course, play a role). The fact is that a constantly high unemployment rate, especially among educated youths, makes competition for attractive positions extremely intense; worse-paid and less prestigious jobs, on the other hand, tend not to meet the aspirations of Vietnamese youths or their parents. This sentiment of relative deprivation that is felt by the Vietnamese (and by other migrant youths who are socialised and educated in Polish schools but whose upward mobility is then blocked) might be a significant "push" factor for motivating further migration to other countries (like the United States or "old" European Union countries) in subsequent generations.

The future problems of migrant youths currently entering the labour market and of migrant children entering the public school system will certainly grow in importance, even if it is now largely overlooked by social scientists and policy-makers in Poland and, probably, in other CEE countries. As Alejandro Portes (1999: 29-30) noted, "The long-term effects of immigration for the host society depend less on the fate of first generation immigrants than on their descendants. Patterns of adaptation of the first generation set the stage for what is to come, but issues such as the continuing dominance [of a host society's language], the growth of a welfare-dependent population, the resilience or disappearance of culturally distinct enclaves, and the decline or growth of ethnic intermarriages will be decided among its children and grandchildren."

5. Recommendations

Because settlement migration to Poland is still in an initial phase and relatively few migrant youths are growing up in the country, no serious challenges have been met yet. Thus, at this stage, recommendations refer primarily to: the improvement of statistical data collection; initiatives to facilitate the structural integration of particular groups of migrants; the promotion of multicultural education; and the recognition of migrant youths' participation in the Polish education system.

5.1. Data Collection

Reliable data is a prerequisite for analyzing the dynamics of integration (especially in its long-term, cross-generational aspects) and for objectively evaluating the outcomes of policies and initiatives that are implemented to facilitate the process. One way of building on the data resources would be to include a sub-sample of immigrant households into existing panel studies like the BAEL (Labour Force Survey) or the PGSS (Polish General Social Survey): doing so would provide valuable insight without having to allocate large amounts of additional funding. Moreover, the already-mentioned panel studies and other surveys should include questions to identify immigrants (ideally, by generational status), find out how long they have been in Poland and whether there have been any changes in their migrant status (for example, from restricted residency to naturalisation).

Another means of gaining additional information could be to take advantage of the data gathered by administrative bodies during their official activities. This data that relates, among other things, to the number of: implemented integration programmes, the share of long-term unemployed persons and beneficiaries of the social welfare system among migrants, and foreign students whose fees are waived by public schools should be reported to the Central Statistical Office and made widely available to researchers.

5.2. Structural Integration

The possession of legal residency and employment permits is a key aspect of migrants' structural integration that greatly facilitates further integration. However, since the unemployment rate among the native Polish population remains alarmingly high (up to 28% among 25-35 year-olds[78]), any attempts to increase the share of immigrants in the primary labour market through administrative decisions or quotas might provoke social conflict and cause host society members to adopt hostile attitude towards foreigners and immigrants.

[78] Central Statistical Office: *http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/praca_ludnosc/mies_inf_bezrobocie/2004/1204.htm*

Given these dangers, more attention should be paid to promoting forms of self-employment and the expansion of the SME[79] sector among immigrants (especially among humanitarian migrants and repatriates). For example, the vast number of immigrant babysitters and domestic sector workers currently working in Poland should be permitted to exit the shadow economy and enter the regular market as self-employed individuals; this would allow them to legalise their residence, increase their chances of integrating into the host society, and also reunify with their spouses and children, which might even contribute to improving the age structure of the Polish population. With regards to expanding the SME sector, other forms of economic mobilisation should include training courses in Polish legal and tax procedures and in the basics of accounting, as well as the provision of assistance and/ or consultancy during the initial phases of business development. Since repatriates, refugees, and people with "tolerated stay" status are rarely eligible for bank loans, there should be greater flexibility in awarding start-up loans to small businesses. In fact, the promotion of entrepreneurship, in all its forms, might well contribute to the creation of new jobs and alleviate competition for existing ones.

5.3. Raising Awareness of Growing Cultural Diversity

As this study has already mentioned, Poland is a culturally and ethnically homogenous country. Due to a relative lack of knowledge about 'exotic' cultures, the recent increase in diversity might lead to confusion and misunderstandings between the foreign and host societies and, eventually, to the social isolation of the "alien group". One group that could, potentially, risk such isolation is the Chechen one, for the general level of awareness of Islamic culture and religion is rather superficial and largely driven by stereotypes.

Clearly, greater efforts are needed to avoid the build-up of negative social tensions. Besides "orientation training courses" and the development of bilingual guides with basic information on Polish law, society, and culture (which should certainly be made available to migrants in need), professional assistance on cross-cultural competences should be extended to experts (social workers, teachers, police officers, public administration employees, etc.) who work directly with immigrants. The general public should also be targeted by awareness-raising initiatives.

5.4. Mulitculturalism in the Education System

Special curricula promoting ideas of tolerance and multiculturalism have already been prepared, but they have not been sufficiently propagated due to a lack of interest among teachers. In fact, interviews with teachers have proven that only in a few schools have foreign pupils been regarded as individuals who "enrich" the whole class and whose different cultural

[79] Small and Medium Enterprises

background is used to stimulate other pupils interested in learning about cultural diversity. It would therefore be useful to create incentives that promote the inclusion of multiculturalism in classes and the exchange of best-practices in dealing with foreign students in public schools (including on how to introduce them appropriately into the school environment); this would help teachers and educational counsellors to better understand the importance of the issue.

The school attendance and educational achievements of the children of refugees and of people with the "tolerated stay" status should be ensured by the social welfare system that assists them. Therefore, they should be supervised by social workers charged with the individual integration programs or with managing the allowances paid by the Social Assistance authorities. It would also be strongly advisable to secure the funds to purchase school books and the necessary equipment for the children of the poorest migrants and for asylum seekers in refugees shelters.

6. A Note on Methodology

As already mentioned in the report (see Section 3.1), the fact that there is only a small number of immigrant children residing in Poland with their parents[80], coupled with the fact that they are widely dispersed in schools throughout the country, constituted a serious methodological challenge. A further problem lay in the fact that most migrant youths are very young (they are only now entering the first classes of elementary school) and interviewing them raised many doubts: for example, young children lack the necessary reflective ability to asses their own position relative to "in-groups or "out-groups", and questions concerning experiences of social exclusion or racial discrimination may be more psychologically unsettling for them than for adults.

To interview migrant parents instead of children presented other problems and was not really feasible. From a logistical point of view, it should be noted that addresses (including those of migrants) are protected by regulations on the privacy of personal data. Moreover, school staff were very reluctant to arrange interviews with migrant parents because many immigrants confuse scientific research methods with interrogations carried out by the police and other administrative bodies. Teachers and school directors felt that involving parents in the research might lead to increased distrust in the schools. Besides, it appeared that in most cases migrant parents only had occasional contacts with the school authorities.

Because of these difficulties, the main focus of the empirical research shifted to interviews with "key informants" like teachers and school counselors, as well as with other adult "contacts" such as priests, heads of ethnic schools, and social workers. These people are in a position to observe migrant children's relations with native children, assess their educational achievements, and identify factors hindering integration, among other things.

The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth. Although they resembled spontaneous conversation and were open to all issues and problems introduced by the interviewee, a common set of topics (slightly different for different groups of experts) was discussed during the talk. In most cases, the interviews were recorded and transcribed, but if the respondent did not allow for recording, detailed notes were taken shortly after the conversation.

As a methodological experiment, Vietnamese youths were asked to fill in a specially-designed online questionnaire; in fact, interviews had confirmed that the Internet is very popular among Vietnamese youth in Poland, as supported by the existence of a number of portals serving Vietnamese residents in Poland and of ethnic Internet cafes/ stations. The questionnaire included a number of open-ended questions (intended, in part, to evaluate written Polish

[80] The categories of unaccompanied minors and of foreign students enrolled in Polish universities were excluded from the study because their situation differs substantially from that of second generation migrant youth who are socialized in Polish society and attend educational institutions.

skills) that dealt with many issues, such as school, relationships with Polish classmates, leisure time, employment prospects in Polish firms, and even questions that referred to respondents' ethnic/ cultural identification and future projections. Unfortunately, Vietnamese internet portals and Vietnamese magazines refused to disseminate information on the online questionnaire either by establishing a link on their webpage or by publishing the web address. Similar difficulties were encountered in attempting to arrange in-depth interviews. Although names, phone numbers and email addresses were provided by two Vietnamese youths who were interviewed (in accordance with the "snow-ball method"), the Vietnamese youth contacted by the researcher refused to participate in the study.

6.1. Interviews

Ukrainians Two priests of the Greek-Catholic parish in Warsaw were interviewed and a focus group interview was conducted with Ukrainian immigrants at the Greek-Catholic Parish Social Club (10 participants).

Armenians Two Armenian teachers were interviewed, as was the head of an Armenian ethnic school. A questionnaire was filled in by 12 Armenian children.

Vietnamese The head of a Vietnamese ethnic school in Warsaw was interviewed, as were two Vietnamese students (both girls). These interviews were supported by field observation activities at the Vietnamese Independence Day celebrations and at the Charity Football Match between Polish actors and Vietnamese migrants living in Poland. In addition, an online questionnaire was filled in by two Vietnamese youths.

The Educational Sector The following interviews were conducted: two interviews with elementary-school educational counselors; one interview with an educational counselor in lower secondary school; three interviews with heads of elementary schools; two interviews with the heads of lower secondary schools; and one interview with an officer from the Mazovian Education Office.

Other interviews The worker of an NGO that runs a shelter for asylum seekers was interviewed, as was a return migrant enrolled in secondary school.

6.2. Other Primary Data Sources

Use was made of four in-depth interviews on a similar subject conducted, at the same time, by the research team of Prof. Joanna Kurczewska. These interviews were with: a teacher from a private lower secondary school in Warsaw; a worker in a refugee shelter; an expert from a Vietnamese ethnic group; and an officer from the Office for Repatriation and Aliens.

The current country study also relied on the information that was gathered through expert interviews conducted by the author during the previous European Commission project entitled *Sharing Experience: Migration Trends in Selected Applicant Countries and Lessons Learned from the 'New Countries of Immigration' in the EU and Austria* (Koryś, 2004).

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