

# Population and labour force changes in Europe in the perspective of 2050

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## Plan of the presentation

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Population and labour force forecast, 2002–2052
- 3. Is "replacement migration" a remedy for population ageing and decline?
- 4. Alternative policy options: increase of fertility and economic activity
- 5. Summary and conclusions

#### 1. Introduction

#### Aims:

- To present results of a study on the impact of international migration, fertility and economic activity on population and labour force dynamics in Europe forecasted for 2002–2052
- To inform the public discussion on plausible policy options to offset the effects of ageing

#### **Geographical scope:**

 27 European countries: EU (without Cyprus and Malta), plus Bulgaria, Romania, Norway and Switzerland

#### 1. Introduction

#### **Background:**

- According to many demographers, the 21st century
  will likely mark the end of the World population growth
  (civilisational changes, globalisation...) [Lutz et al., 2004]
- Population ageing is increasingly important, especially in the developed regions like Europe. This can cause problems for the economy and social cohesion (health care, social security...) [Kupiszewski et al., 2004]
- Due to the specificity of population processes, the consequences of current demographic patterns will not be seen by 2015, but only in a longer horizon





Selected results for Base, High and Low migration assumptions

Country	Population (x1000)				Labour force resources (x1000)			
	2002	2052 <b>B</b>	2052 <b>H</b>	2052 <b>L</b>	2002	2052 <b>B</b>	2052 <b>H</b>	2052 <b>L</b>
Austria	8 053	7 853	8 739	7 277	3 929	3 267	3 777	2 925
Bulgaria	7 869	4 485	5 210	3 769	3 397	1 865	2 259	1 490
France	59 486	70 381	79 189	64 230	26 719	32 096	37 108	28 594
Germany	82 488	77 007	86 093	71 096	40 673	32 907	38 161	29 374
Poland	38 425	31 267	35 988	27 277	17 329	12 931	15 459	10 857
Sweden	8 925	9 993	11 111	9 173	4 526	4 700	5 335	4 234
UK	59 232	65 481	74 353	59 292	29 738	29 325	34 217	25 907
Italy	57 157	54 044	62 813	48 280	22 983	19 440	23 688	16 629
EUR-27	494 179	494 922	562 967	446 928	232 759	209 710	246 600	183 608



Age structure of population and labour force in 27 countries: Forecast for 2052 – Base, High and Low migration scenarios







Potential Support Ratio (PSR) in 2052: Base scenario


 $PSR = \frac{Pop. 15-64}{Pop. 65+}$ 

Pop. - Population

Average PSR:

in 2002: **4.18** 

in 2052: **1.82** 





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# 2. Population and labour force forecast, 2002–2052

Elderly Support Ratio (ESR) in 2052: Base scenario


ESR = Act. 15-64 Inact. 65+

Act. – economically active population; Inact. – inactive

Average ESR:

in 2002: **3.09** 

in 2052: **1.51** 





Labour Market Support Ratio (LMSR) in 2052: Base scenario


 $LMSR = \frac{Act. 15+}{Inact. 15+}$ 

Act. – economically active population; Inact. – inactive

Average LMSR:

in 2002: **1.30** 

in 2052: **0.95** 





# 3. Is "replacement migration" a remedy?

The forecasts show that population ageing is expected to be significantly advanced by 2052.

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Is the option of increasing immigration, to prevent the support ratios from declining, realistic in the long run?



Many studies, including this one, show that NO: migration would have to increase without end, similarly to the *financial pyramid* schemes.



# 3. Is "replacement migration" a remedy?

"Replacement migration" simulations for 2002–2052


3 variants, with non-decreasing:

- PSR

ESR

- LMSR

Pop. in 2002



## 4. Alternative policy options

#### (a) Increase fertility

 In the long run, it is the only way to slow down the ageing of population and labour force resources,

#### but:

- No singe policy instrument can do it a combination of various policies is needed [Grant et al., 2004]
- Such (serious) policies are usually very expensive
- As population processes have large inertia, the results
  of such policies would be observed with a time delay
  [Lutz et al., 2003]

## 4. Alternative policy options

#### (b) Increase economic activity

- For Europe, this is a good mid-term (40–50 years) option, until fertility policies begin to work
- There still is an unused labour force potential in Europe, especially as compared with the US, especially with respect to the activity of women and the elderly
- Problem acknowledged at the EU level (Lisbon Strategy)

#### but:

 Policy instruments should be consistent with the ones aimed at increasing fertility, and enable to reconcile work (career) with family life



# 5. Summary and conclusions

#### Results of the forecasts

- In the scenario with Base migration, the overall population of the 27 countries is hardly expected to change over 50 years, but the labour force resources are foreseen to decline by 10%
- Population and labour force ageing in Europe is universal, but its tempo differs very much between the countries under study

#### Policy recommendations

- Population and labour force policies should be complex and combine measures aimed at increasing fertility (long-term), economic activity (mid-term), and migration (short-term only)
- As indicated by numerous other studies, an increase in the retirement age would be also necessary in a long run
- Partial reforms and policy solutions are doomed to fail



# Thank you for your attention!

Dziękuję za uwagę – Merci pour votre attention

More details about the project and its results:

«www.cefmr.pan.pl»

An article is also forthcoming in vol. 22 (2006) of European Journal of Population / Revue Européenne de Démographie